Undue Influence to challenge a Will or Power of Attorney
A grievance based upon undue
influence may be sustained by showing that the beneficiary had a confidential
relationship with the party who established the account. Accordingly, if the
challenger can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the survivor had a
confidential relationship with the donor who established the account, there is
a presumption of undue influence, which the surviving donee must rebut by clear
and convincing evidence.
[Estate of Ostlund v. Ostlund, 391 N.J. Super.
390, 401 (App. Div. 2007).]
Although perhaps difficult to define, the concept
"encompasses all relationships 'whether legal, natural or conventional in
their origin, in which confidence is naturally inspired, or, in fact,
reasonably exists.’” Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20,
34 (1988) (internal citation omitted). "And while family ties alone may
not qualify, parent-child relationships have been found to be among the most
typical of confidential relationships." DeFrank, supra,
slip op. at 13 (citing Ostlund, supra, 391N.J.
Super. at 401).
In the context of inter vivos gifts, "a presumption
of undue influence arises when the contestant proves that the donee dominated
the will of the donor or when a confidential relationship exists between the
donor and done." Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at
30 (internal citations omitted). "Where parties enjoy a relationship in
which confidence is naturally inspired or reasonably exists, the person who has
gained an advantage due to that confidence has the burden of proving that no
undue influence was used to gain that advantage," In re Estate of
Penna,322 N.J. Super.
417, 423 (App. Div. 1999), and "the donee has the burden of
showing by clear and convincing evidence not only that 'no deception was
practiced therein, no undue influence used, and that all was fair, open and
voluntary, but that it was well understood.'" In re Estate of
Mosery, 349 N.J. Super.
515, 522-23 (App. Div. 2002) (citing In re Dodge, 50 N.J. 192,
227 (1967)).
The person receiving gifts and greater benefit had a
burden to show no deception was practiced and that all of the transactions were
fair, open and voluntary, and that they were well understood.
One of the major cases dealing with
undue influence was Haynes v. First National State Bank of New Jersey,
87 N.J. 163, 75-76 (1981). Here the Supreme Court held that the burden of proof
establishing undue influence shifts to the proponent when a will benefits a
person who stood in a confidential relationship to the decedent and there are
suspicious circumstances, which need explanation. The suspicious circumstances
need only be slight. Id. at 176. Moreover, when the evidence is almost
entirely in the possession of one party and the evidence points to the
proponent as asserting undue influence, a clear and convincing standard may be applied
rather than the normal burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 183.
Furthermore, the Haynes analysis
was extended to situations in which there is a transfer of property where the
beneficiary of the property and an attorney is on one side and the donor on the
other. See Oachs v. Stanton, 280 N.J. Super. 478, 483 (App. Div. 1995).
The court in Oachs determined
that under circumstances such as these the donee bears the burden of proof to
establish the validity of the gift, even in situations in which the donee did
not dominate the decedent’s will. Id. at 485. This rule was established
to protect a donor from making a decision induced by a confidential
relationship the donee possesses with the donor. Id. Again, the burden
is a clear and convincing standard. Id.
The Supreme Court in Pascale v.
Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 31 (1998), stated that when a donor makes a gift to a
donee that he/she is dependent upon, a presumption arises that the donor did
not understand the consequences of his/her act. In these situations the donee
must demonstrate that the donor had disinterested and competent counsel. Id.
Likewise, undue influence is conclusive, when a mentally or physically
weakened donor makes a gift without advice or a means of support, to a donee
upon whom he/she depends. Id.
A confidential relationship can be
found to exist when one is certain that the parties dealt on unequal terms. In
re Stroming’s Will, 12 N.J. Super. 217, 224 (1951). The appropriate inquiry
is if a confidential relationship existed, did the parties deal on terms and
conditions of equality? Blake v. Brennan, 1 N.J. Super. 446, 453 (1948).
Suspicious circumstances are not
required to create a presumption of undue influence with regard to inter vivos
gifts and the presumption of undue influence is more easily raised in an inter
vivos transfer. See Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31; Bronson v.
Bronson, 218 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 1987).
Generally, an adult is presumed to be
competent to make an inter vivos gift. See Conners v. Murphy, 100 N.J.
Eq. 280, 282 (E. & A. 1926); Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 29
(1988). However, when a party alleges undue influence with regard to an inter
vivos gift, the contesting party must prove undue influence existed or that a
presumption of undue influence should arise. Pascale, supra, 113
N.J. at 30.
A presumption of undue influence arises
when a confidential relationship exists between the donor and donee or where the contestant proves the
donee dominated the Will of the donor. Id.; see also Seylaz v.
Bennett, 5 N.J. 168, 172 (1950); In re Dodge, 50 N.J. 192, 227
(1967); Mott v. Mott, 49 N.J. Eq. 192, 198 (Ch. 1891); Oachs v.
Stanton, 280 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that where a
confidential relationship existed and that the donor did not rely upon the
donee, a shifting of the burden was still appropriate); In re Neuman’s
Estate, 133 N.J. Eq. 532, 534-35 (E. & A. 1943) (stating in a will
context “Such burden does not shift merely because of the existence of a confidential
relationship, without more, as in the matter of gifts inter vivos.”)
The In re Dodge court explained
why a presumption of undue influence arises in a confidential relationship and
stated: “In the application of this rule it is not necessary that the donee
occupy such a dominant position toward the donor as to create an inference that
the donor was unable to assert his will in opposition to that of the donee.” In
Re Dodge, 50 N.J. 192 (1967). The court referenced a much earlier case in
explaining the rule’s application:
"Its purpose is not so much to
afford protection to the donor against the consequences of undue influence
exercised over him by the donee, as it is to afford him protection against the
consequences voluntary action on his part induced by the existence of the
relationship between them, the effect of which upon his own interests he may
only partially understand or appreciate." In re Dodge, supra,
50 N.J. at 228 citing Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J. Eq. 447, 449 (E. & A.
1904).
In sum, once it is proven that a
confidential relationship exists the burden shifts to the donee to show by
clear and convincing evidence that no undue influence was used. Although the
case law indicates suspicious circumstances need not be shown the donee must
show all was fair, open and voluntary, no deception was practiced and that the
transaction was well understood. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31;
see also In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 227; Seylaz, supra,
5 N.J. at 173. Furthermore, confidential relationships arise in all types of
relationships “whether legal, natural or conventional in their origin, in which
confidence is naturally inspired, or, in fact, reasonably exists.” In re Fulper’s Estate, 99 N.J. Eq.
292, 314 (Prerog. Ct. 1926); see Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 34.
It appears confidential relationships exist in all cases in which:
"The relations between the
[contracting] parties appear to be of such a character as to render it certain
that they do not deal on terms of equality, but that either on the one side
from superior knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or
from over-mastering influence; or on the other from weakness, dependence or
trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage is rendered probable." Pascale,
supra, 113 N.J. at 34, quoting In re Fulper, supra, 99
N.J. Eq. at 314; see also In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 228.
In determining whether the Defendant
was the dominant person in the relationship there is no clear-cut rule and
instead the court must look to the particular circumstances of the matter. In
re Fulper, supra, 99 N.J. Eq. at 315; Giacobbi v. Anselmi, 18
N.J. Super. 600, 616 (Ch. Div. 1952). In Fulper the court determined
that a confidential relationship existed in a father-son relationship in which
the father was advanced in age, weak and physically depended upon the son.
Moreover, since the father sought the son’s assistance on business matters,
lived with the son during the winter months and gave the son joint and several
power over his checking account an actual repose of trust and confidence in the
son was demonstrated. In re Fulper, supra, 99 N.J. Eq. at 318.
In the Giacobbi case, supra,
a confidential relationship was determined to exist between a mother and
daughter, even though the mother did not suffer from mental or physical
infirmity. There the mother was found to be alert, active, and somewhat
independent. However, she turned to the daughter for small issues and problems
when they occurred. Giacobbi, supra, 18 N.J. Super. at 617.
Therefore, the burden can shift to
Defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence the transaction was not
unduly influenced. Furthermore, where a donor makes an “improvident” gift to
the donee upon whom she depends that strips the donor of all or virtually all
their assets, as here, a presumption arises that the donor did not understand
the consequences of their act. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31,
citing Vanderbach v. Vollinger, 1 N.J. 481, 489 (1949). Under those
circumstances the donee must establish that the donor had the advice of
competent and disinterested counsel. Id. citing Vanderback, supra,
1 N.J .at 488-89.
Similarly, when a mentally or
physically weakened donor makes a gift to a donee whom the donor is dependent
upon, without advice, and the gift leaves the donee without adequate means of
support, a conclusive presumption of undue influence arises. Id. citing Seylaz,
supra, 5 N.J. at 173. However, when a donor is not dependent upon the
donee “independent advice is not a prerequisite to the validity of an
improvident gift even though the relationship between the parties is one of
trust and confidence.” Id. citing Seylaz, supra, 5 N.J. at
173.
Although suspicious circumstances are
not required to be established in an inter vivos transfer for a presumption of
undue influence to exist, thereby shifting the burden of proof, Plaintiff has
raised the issue. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 30.
If Undue Influence was 'Clear,' the Will of the Elderly
Testatrix is Denied Admission to Probate.
The testatrix's Will was properly
rejected as the product of undue influence because the proponent and the
testatrix had a confidential relationship and because there were
"suspicious circumstances" surrounding the execution of the will.
In Re Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Catelli 361 NJ Super. 478
(App. Div. 2003)
In the Catelli case, Thomas R.
Villone was named by his elderly aunt, Anna Villone Catelli, as the executor in
a will and as the trustee under a living trust, which she executed on January
9, 1996. He appeals from the decision of the Chancery Division which refused to
admit that 1996 will to probate, which named his cousin, George Villone, as the
Administrator C.T.A. of Catelli's estate, which ordered him to restore assets
to the estate, which awarded counsel fees and which dismissed a related
complaint that he had filed in his effort to enforce certain provisions of the
1996 trust.
The decision of the trial court was
made following two days of testimony and the consideration by the court of deposition
testimony given by witnesses, including Thomas Villone, who could not appear in
New Jersey. In that decision, the court first held that, as a matter of public
policy, the will could not be admitted to probate because at the time of the
execution of the 1996 will, Anna Catelli had become blind and the only person
who could verify that the contents of the documents had been read to her so
that she knew what she was signing was Thomas, who the disputed documents made
her sole heir. As an alternate ground, the judge analyzed the testimony and the
evidence in the nature of an application for a directed verdict at the close of
the plaintiff's case and determined that Thomas Villone could not prevail on
the merits. Because we affirm the decision of the court based upon the
alternate ground, we do not address the court's public policy rationale.
Viewed in the light most favorable to
Thomas Villone, the record discloses the following facts. The testator, Anna
Catelli, was a widow who had no children and who lived alone. She had a number
of nieces and nephews, including Thomas Villone and George Villone. She also
had a brother, Robert, who died in Florida in 1994. Robert had named Thomas,
his nephew, as the executor and principal beneficiary of his estate. Thomas,
who was a self- employed long distance truck driver living in Arizona, had not
had much contact with Anna Catelli, but telephoned to tell her of her brother's
death. In that conversation, Catelli had asked him to come and visit her when
he was next in New Jersey and he thereafter did so.
Early in 1994, while Thomas was
visiting her at her home, then in Springfield, Catelli asked him to drive her
to her lawyer's office in Maplewood, which he did. He learned that day that
Catelli had named him as her alternate power of attorney in the event that her
long-time physician and confidante, Dr. Coppola, was unable to serve. While he
was not aware of it at the time, she had gone to the lawyer's office that day
to execute a will that left her estate to a variety of relatives and friends
and to two churches and which included him as one of the residuary
beneficiaries. Later that year, Catelli suffered a significant stroke which
left her partially paralyzed and with limited powers of speech and sight. She
was moved by Dr. Coppola to a nursing home, and thereafter to the Garden
Terrace Nursing Home where she remained until her death. Thomas visited her at
the nursing home from time to time when he was in New Jersey. Shortly before
Thanksgiving 1995, Dr. Coppola telephoned Thomas and told him that Catelli
wanted to make him her sole heir. Dr. Coppola died two or three days later.
Following Dr. Coppola's death,
Thomas invoked the power of attorney to make $10,000 gifts to himself, his wife
and his daughter. He next received from Dr. Coppola's son all of the papers
relating to Catelli's assets. While Thomas then knew that the designation of
him as the sole heir was a departure from her earlier will, he did not discuss
this apparent change of plans with Catelli. Rather, he immediately consulted an
attorney in Arizona who prepared a living trust, which named Thomas as the
trustee, and a pour-over will which named Thomas as the executor and sole heir.
The Arizona attorney gave the documents to Thomas along with a letter which
instructed him to have the documents reviewed by a New Jersey attorney and
which suggested that Anna be represented by independent counsel. Thomas then
came to New Jersey, arriving on January 6, 1996. While Thomas knew that Catelli
had been represented in the past by the lawyer in Maplewood, he did not contact
him and did not consult with any other New Jersey lawyer. Instead, he went
directly to the nursing home and visited with Catelli.
Over the course of the next
three days, while she remained in her bed and dozed on and off, he read the
documents to her. Thomas has a high school education and concedes that he would
not have been able to explain or interpret any of the language of the trust or
the will to Catelli. He was aware that the trust and the will together would
enable him to avoid probate, but he did not understand why that might be
advantageous. At no time did he suggest that Catelli consult with an attorney
or offer to contact her New Jersey lawyer for her.
After three days, Thomas made
arrangements with the administrator of the nursing home to execute the trust
and the will. The administrator served as a notary and two nurses observed
Catelli place an "X" on the line Thomas indicated. Shortly after the
execution, Thomas gave up his truck driving job, employed himself as the
full-time manager of Catelli's assets and undertook to gain control of
Catelli's interest in Excelsior Realty Ltd. (Excelsior), a family real estate
venture, through the trust instrument. Prior to Catelli's death, Thomas'
efforts to gain control of her interest in Excelsior consisted of
correspondence with his cousin George Villone who was the General Partner of
that venture. George Villone refused to acknowledge the validity of the January
9, 1996 trust agreement and refused to turn control of Catelli's interest in
Excelsior over to Thomas. He continued to refuse after Catelli's death on July
5, 1997. As a result, in March 1999, Thomas instituted litigation, in his
capacity as the executor of Catelli's estate and as her heir, against George
Villone and Excelsior to force a transfer of Catelli's interest to him. That
complaint was consolidated with the action filed subsequently by Thomas in the
Chancery Division, Probate Part seeking to have the disputed will admitted to
probate.
The judge elected to first receive
evidence relating to whether the 1996 will should be admitted to probate. At
the close of the evidence offered in favor of the admission of the will, the
trial court held, first, that Thomas Villone had failed to demonstrate that
Catelli knew the contents of the documents that she had signed. Relying on
Harris v. Vanderveer's Executor, 21 N.J. Eq. 561, 563 (E. & A. 1870),
Hildreth v. Marshall, 51 N.J. Eq. 241, 250 (Prerog. Ct. 1893) and Day v. Day, 3
N.J. Eq. 549, 553-55 (Prerog. Ct. 1831), the judge rejected the will. While
each of these decisions includes a discussion of the effect of visual
impairment on the knowing execution of a will, each of them arose in the
context of a dispute based on allegations of undue influence.
Thus, while each of these
precedents rejected a proffered will executed by a testator with a significant
visual or other impairment, none requires proof of knowing execution beyond
that specified by the statute. N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2; N.J.S.A. 3B:3-4. The judge,
however, reasoned that although the will had been executed in accordance with
the statutory formalities, public policy demands proof beyond compliance with
the formalities of execution if the testator can no longer see. He held that
the will was invalid because there was no evidence from anyone other than the
sole beneficiary that the will had been read to Catelli and that she knew what
she was signing. He therefore created an additional requirement for probate of
a will executed by a visually impaired person, citing public policy. We
appreciate the trial judge's concern that a testatrix with a severe visual
impairment is ordinarily unable, without the intervention of a neutral person,
to determine if the will as drafted accurately memorializes her testamentary
instructions. The same, of course, is true of a testator who cannot read by
reason of illiteracy. But whether the statutory provisions for the witnessing
and execution of the wills of such testators should be augmented to require
that the pre-execution reading of the will to the testator be by a
disinterested person is, in our view, a matter within the province of the
Legislature.
The court held We are satisfied, at
least in this case, that we need not further consider that issue because, as
the judge found, this record speaks so clearly of undue influence. The trial
judge addressed the alternate ground of undue influence using the standard of a
directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs. R. 4:37-2(b). He found
that there was a confidential relationship between the decedent and the
beneficiary, that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the
execution, that undue influence was therefore presumed, that the burden to
overcome the presumption therefore shifted to Thomas and that the record before
the court made it impossible for him to carry that burden. He therefore refused
to admit the will to probate, dismissed the complaint against George Villone
and Excelsior, admitted Catelli's 1994 will to probate, appointed George
Villone as the Administrator C.T.A., directed Thomas to restore assets to the
estate and approved fees and commissions. We agree with the judge's alternate
analysis of the probate dispute and we affirm on that ground.
Viewed in terms of undue influence,
there can be no doubt about the issues before us. The judge identified several
factors that supported his analysis of undue influence, including the fact that
Thomas retained his own attorney to prepare the documents, that he did so based
only on the conversation with Dr. Coppola and without any consultation with
Catelli herself, that the documents were markedly different from Catelli's
prior will, that Catelli was very debilitated and vulnerable, that the effect
of the documents was an immediate vesting of control of all assets in Thomas
through the inter vivos trust document, and that Thomas immediately upon the
death of Dr. Coppola left his employment and by means of the power of attorney
began to pay himself a commission and dispensed substantial gifts to himself
and his immediate family, which bespoke self-dealing even prior to the time of
the execution of the disputed documents.
The court held: We concur with
the judge's analysis of the effect of these facts. First, Catelli was clearly
not well. The nursing administrator who saw her daily conceded that, while she
had made progress in recovering from her stroke, her level of functioning was
seriously diminished. Her short-term memory was significantly impaired. Her
vision had deteriorated substantially. She required total care by the staff at
the nursing home, needing daily assistance with feeding, bathing, and other
basic needs. During the three days prior to the execution of the document, she
did not leave her room, but remained in bed, dozing from time to time and
barely communicating with anyone. While she was undoubtedly fond of Thomas, who
was virtually her only visitor after the death of Dr. Coppola, she was
especially vulnerable to his influence.
Moreover, Thomas acted in a
manner, which made his intentions clear. Even accepting as true his testimony
that he learned from Dr. Coppola that Catelli intended to make him her sole
heir, his behavior proves that he acted so as to overbear her will. He made no
effort to discuss Catelli's intentions with her prior to acting for his
unilateral benefit. He knew that Catelli had an attorney in New Jersey who had
prepared at least one earlier will, but he deprived Catelli of the opportunity
to consult with him. He did so in spite of the urging of his personal attorney
from Arizona to have the documents reviewed by New Jersey counsel and to give
Catelli the benefit of independent legal advice. He knew as well that the 1994
will left significant assets to the two churches and a hospital, left numerous
specific bequests to friends and to a few family members, and included him only
as one of the residuary beneficiaries. Nonetheless, he made no effort to
discuss with Catelli why all were to be rejected in favor of him alone.
Nor did he simply carry out the
instruction that he be made her sole heir. Instead, he used his own attorney to
secure immediate control of her assets. He knew that Catelli had not previously
utilized a trust and he knew from his own lawyer that a living trust with a
pour-over will would give him control before Catelli died. In fact as soon as
he had the ability to exercise any control through the power of attorney, he
gave $30,000 in gifts to himself, his wife and his daughter, an act well in
excess of any prior expression of generosity by Catelli and not one she
authorized. Shortly thereafter, he embarked on a new career, hiring himself to
be the full time manager of her assets, in spite of his lack of any relevant
training or experience. Those acts are the behavior not of one with Catelli's
interests at heart, but of one bent on his own enrichment at her expense.
The law governing undue influence is
well established. While we generally presume that the testator is of sound mind
and competent to execute a will, Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N.J. 65, 71 (1950),
even a will which on its face appears to have been validly executed can be
overturned upon a demonstration of undue influence. Haynes v. First Nat'l State
Bank, 87 N.J. 163, 175-76 (1981). Similarly, an inter vivos transfer, as was
this trust, is equally governed by the undue influence analysis. In re Dodge,
50 N.J. 192, 227-29 (1967); see Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 29-31 (1988).
Undue influence is "defined as
'mental, moral or physical' exertion which has destroyed the 'free agency of a
testator' by preventing the testator 'from following the dictates of his own
mind and will and accepting instead the domination and influence of
another.'" Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, supra, 87 N.J. at 176
(quoting In re Neuman, 133 N.J. Eq. 532, 534 (E. & A. 1943)). Where the
will benefits one who enjoyed a confidential relationship with the testator,
and where there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the will, the law
presumes undue influence and the burden is upon the proponent of the will to
disprove the presumption. In re Rittenhouse's Will, 19 N.J. 376, 378-79 (1955).
The court held: The confidential relationship
between Thomas and Catelli is both plain and conceded. See Haynes v. First
Nat'l State Bank, supra, 87 N.J. at 176; In re Estate of Hopper, 9 N.J. 280,
282 (1952). The suspicious circumstances surrounding the will need only be
"slight" to shift the burden of proof to the proponent to overcome
them. See In re Estate of Lehner, 70 N.J. 434, 436 (1976); In re Blake's Will,
21 N.J. 50, 55-56 (1956).
Once the burden has shifted, the will proponent must
overcome that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Haynes v. First
Nat'l State Bank, supra, 87 N.J. at 177-78; In re Estate of Weeks, 29 N.J.
Super. 533, 538-39 (App. Div. 1954); see In re Estate of Churik, 165 N.J.
Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd o.b., 78 N.J. 563 (1979). See also Pascale
v. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31 (holding that donee of inter vivos gift bears
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence).
The court held The record before us
discloses no evidence by which Thomas could meet this burden. On the contrary,
the record is overwhelmingly supportive of the finding of undue influence. The
combination of the confidential relationship and the suspicious circumstances
was more than sufficient to shift the burden to Thomas. The absence of any
evidence tending to negate the presumption and the abundant evidence of
self-dealing by Thomas support the conclusion that the testator's will was
overborne. The trial judge, having heard and considered the evidence,
appropriately found that the burden that had shifted to Thomas was one that he
was unable to carry. Affirmed.
KENNETH
VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax) 732-572-0030
TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
In his private practice, he has devoted
a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of
litigated matters. He appears in Courts
throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters,
Criminal and Municipal/traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested
administrative law hearings.
Mr. Vercammen served as the Prosecutor
for the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County and was involved in trials on a
weekly basis. He also argued all
pre-trial motions and post-trial applications on behalf of the State of New
Jersey.
He has also served as a Special Acting
Prosecutor in Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Hightstown, Carteret, East Brunswick,
Jamesburg, South Brunswick, South River
and South Plainfield for conflict cases.
Since 1989, he has personally handled hundreds of criminal and motor
vehicle matters as a Prosecutor and now as defense counsel and has had
substantial success.
Previously, Mr. Vercammen was Public
Defender for the Township of Edison and Borough of Metuchen and a Designated
Counsel for the Middlesex County Public Defender's Office. He represented indigent individuals facing consequences of
magnitude. He was in Court trying cases
and making motions in difficult criminal and DWI matters. Every case he personally handled and
prepared.
His resume sets forth the numerous bar
associations and activities which demonstrate his commitment to the legal
profession and providing quality representation to clients.
Since 1985, his primary concentration
has been on litigation matters. Mr.
Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court) with the Delaware County, PA
District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings, Middlesex County Probation Department as a Probation Officer, and an Executive
Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.
