Suit for tortious interference with a Bequest must be filed in Probate Court
Felix M. Garruto, et al. v. Lorraine Cannici 12-21-07
A-2447-06T1

The Court held that an action for tortious interference with a bequest, premised upon undue influence by means of fraud, is barred when plaintiffs, with knowledge of probate proceedings, have failed to file a timely challenge to the will in probate court.

Quarg- Long time girlfriend's share should be set by contract law, not constructive trust
In the Matter of the Estate of Robert O. Quarg,
deceased 1-23-08
A-2459-06T3

Decedent's wife, from whom he had been estranged for over forty years, appealed the Chancery Division's order imposing a constructive trust on her surviving spouse's share of decedent's intestate estate in favor of decedent's companion, with whom he had lived since shortly after the estrangement. The court held that, decedent's conduct and actions, together with the lengthy time decedent and his companion lived together, and their mutual consideration as husband and wife, was sufficient to establish a question of fact whether there was an implied promise by decedent to ensure that his companion received adequate provisions during the remainder of her life. The court determined that the Chancery Division mistakenly relied upon an equitable principle of a constructive trust and the court remanded the matter for a determination whether such an implied contractual promise
could be established.

In the Matter of Anthony Crimaldi

12-06-07 A-3310-06T3

In determining whether a claimant may seek an accidental
disability retirement in the event of a "delayed manifestation
of the disability" more than five years after the traumatic
event, the Board of Trustees must consider the totality of
factors including when the delayed manifestation actually
occurred, why the filing was delayed, and prejudice to the
Public Employees Retirement System.

B.D. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health
Services, et al.
A-1868-06T1 12-10-07

In this appeal, the court considered whether B.D., a
seventy-seven-year-old, wheelchair-bound woman already in need
of services, received fair market value when she transferred her
home, which had been appraised at $259,917, together with the
right to receive the rental income on an apartment within the
home that was then generating $1,180 per month, to her grandson
in exchange for his satisfaction of a $67,374.98 mortgage,
$10,191.70 in cash, and a lease of the other apartment within
the home to B.D. "for life." Concluding that the phrase "for
life," which was accompanied by unexplained references in the
lease to B.D.'s life expectancy, together with uncertainty as to
B.D.'s rights to the leasehold if she ceased occupying them,
rendered questionable B.D.'s claim that she received fair market
value and warranted a hearing into the meaning of the lease
terms.