Medicaid did not give full credit for caretaker non medical expenses E.C., Petitioner-Appellant, v. DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES and UNION COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

Medicaid did not give full credit for caretaker non medical expenses

E.C.,
Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH SERVICES and UNION COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0832-17T4 

Submitted February 7, 2019 – Decided March 25, 2019 

Before Judges Whipple and DeAlmeida. 

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services. 

SB2 Inc., attorneys for appellant (Laurie M. Higgins, on the brief). 

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Jacqueline R. D'Alessandro, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM
Plaintiff E.C. appeals from the September 7, 2017 final decision of the 

Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS) adopting the initial decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding E.C. eligible for Medicaid benefits, but assessing a transfer penalty of $81,102.20. We affirm. 

I.
The following facts are derived from the record. On September 10, 2015, 

E.C., then 103 years old and a resident of a nursing home, applied through a representative to the Union County Board of Social Services (the Board) for Medicaid benefits. On April 25, 2016, the Board found E.C. eligible for benefits as of August 1, 2015. However, the Board imposed a period of ineligibility of 334 days, from August 1, 2015 to June 29, 2016, due to E.C.'s transfer of $111,051.01 in assets to her niece, P.R., within the five-year look-back period. 

E.C. requested a fair hearing with respect to the transfer penalty. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law, where a fair hearing was held before ALJ Joan Bedrin Murray. At the hearing, a representative of the Board testified that after the initial decision, the Board obtained proof that a portion of the $111,051.01 transferred to P.R. was used to pay E.C.'s rent. As a 

2 

A-0832-17T4 

result, the parties stipulated to a reduction in the penalty amount to $84,702.20, adjusting the period of ineligibility to April 29, 2016. 

L.B. testified that she began providing caretaker services to E.C. in 2014 and was paid $150 a week in cash to assist her with housekeeping, meal preparation, bathing, and toileting. According to L.B., in May 2015, E.C. fractured her hip and was admitted to a nursing home. Although the nursing facility provided caregiver services to its residents, L.B. testified that she continued to provide care to E.C. after she was admitted to the facility, and until E.C.'s death in June 2016. L.B. testified that she also received additional funds, the amount of which she approximated, from P.R.'s spouse that she used for grocery shopping, podiatrist visits, and purchasing household items for E.C. L.B. testified that she collected receipts for these purchases and gave those receipts to P.R. No receipts were produced at the hearing. 

After the hearing, P.R. submitted an affidavit stating that she maintained a separate bank account containing funds transferred to her by E.C. She stated that she spent $57,340.89 of E.C.'s funds on E.C.'s behalf. Included with the affidavit was a spreadsheet compiled by counsel that P.R. said represented the purchases she made on behalf of E.C. The post-trial submission did not include bank records for the account or receipts for any purchases. 

3 

A-0832-17T4 

On June 16, 2017, ALJ Murray issued an initial decision affirming the imposition of a transfer penalty, but reducing the amount to $81,102.20. The ALJ found credible L.B.'s testimony that she provided caregiver services to E.C. from December 2014 to May 2015, when E.C. was admitted to the nursing home, receiving $3600 for her work. The ALJ found a lack of credible evidence establishing that the other expenditures about which L.B. testified were made for fair market value, given the absence of receipts. ALJ Murray found that P.R.'s affidavit was not credible, because P.R. could not be cross-examined, and because her statements were not corroborated. Thus, she concluded E.C. had not overcome the presumption that expenditures beyond the $3600 were for the purpose of accelerating E.C.'s Medicaid eligibility. See N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j). 

On September 7, 2017, the Director, DMAHS issued a final agency decision adopting ALJ Murray's initial decision. The Director adopted the ALJ's credibility determinations, and agreed with her observation that the hearing record did not contain credible evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the disallowed transfers were made for early qualification for Medicaid. The Director rejected the evidentiary value of P.R.'s affidavit because it was vague and uncorroborated. Finally, the Director rejected E.C.'s argument that because she was in good health prior to the fall that resulted in her being 

4 

A-0832-17T4 

admitted to the nursing facility, it was an error to consider her transfer of assets as an effort to accelerate Medicaid eligibility. See N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(k) ("[t]he presence of one or more of the following factors, while not conclusive, may indicate that the assets were transferred exclusively for some purpose other than establishing Medicaid eligibility . . . [t]raumatic onset of disability"). The Director noted E.C.'s advanced age, her receipt of niece's longtime management of her financial affairs as evidence that E.C. was contemplating Medicaid eligibility during the look-back period. 

This appeal followed. E.C. argues that DMAHS should have deducted from the transfer nursing home, and the expenditures made by L.B. on E.C.'s behalf with E.C.'s funds; and (2) $11,924.85 for expenditures by P.R. on behalf of E.C. with E.C.'s funds. In addition, E.C. argues that the ALJ should have considered the sudden onset of her institutionalization as evidence that the 

1 

, it appears that that figure includes the $3600 previously recognized by DMAHS. Therefore, E.C. actually seeks an additional $12,510 deduction. 

The Director's final agency decision refers to 2013, which appears to be a typographical error, in light of L.B.'s testimony that she began providing services to E.C. in 2014. The error is not material to the outcome of this matter. 

5 

A-0832-17T4 

transfers she made during the look-back period were not to accelerate Medicaid eligibility. 

II.
"An administrative agency's decision will be upheld 'unless there is a clear 

showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" R.S. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 434 N.J. Super. 250, 261 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." E.S. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 412 N.J. Super. 340, 349 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006)). "[I]f substantial credible evidence supports an agency's conclusion, a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might have reached a different result." Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992). 

"Medicaid is a federally-created, state-implemented program that provides 'medical assistance to the poor at the expense of the public.'" In re Estate of Brown, 448 N.J. Super. 252, 256 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Estate of 

6 

A-0832-17T4 

DeMartino v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 373 N.J. Super. 210, 217 (App. Div. 2004)); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396-1. To receive federal funding the State must comply with all federal statutes and regulations. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). 

Pursuant to the New Jersey Medical Assistance and Health Services Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4D-1 to -19.5, DMAHS is responsible for administering the Medicaid program in our State. Through its regulations, DMAHS establishes "policy and procedures for the application process[.]" N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(b). "[T]o be financially eligible, the applicant must meet both income and resource standards." Brown, 448 N.J. Super. at 257; see also N.J.A.C. 10:71-3.15; N.J.A.C. 10:71-1.2(a). 

Because Medicaid funds are limited, only those applicants with income and non-exempt resources below specified levels may qualify for government- paid assistance. To qualify for the Medicaid Only program, an individual applicant may not have resources that exceed $2000. N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5(c). Resources are defined "as any real or personal property which is owned by the applicant . . . and which could be converted to cash to be used for his or her support and maintenance." N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(b). 

7 

A-0832-17T4 

An applicant who transfers or disposes of resources for less than fair market value during a sixty-month look-back period before the individual becomes institutionalized or applies for Medicaid is penalized for making the transfer. 42 U.S.C.A. §1396p(c)(1)(E); N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(m)(1). Transfers within the look-back period are presumed to be made to obtain earlier Medicaid eligibility than that to which the applicant would otherwise be entitled. N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(i). The presumption may be rebutted with "convincing evidence that the assets were transferred exclusively (that is, solely) for some other purpose." N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j). If the applicant does not overcome the presumption, a transfer penalty denies Medicaid benefits during the period the applicant should have been using the transferred resources for medical care. See W.T. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 391 N.J. Super. 25, 37 (App. Div. 2007). 

If the applicant transfers any resource within the look-back period, the transfer is reviewed, and the resource's fair market value is ascertained, as is the consideration received for the transferred resource. N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(c). The difference between the fair market value of the resource and the compensation received by the applicant is the "uncompensated value." N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(c)(2). If the uncompensated value of the transferred resources,

8 

A-0832-17T4 

combined with other countable resources, exceeds the resource limit for Medicaid eligibility, a transfer penalty is assessed. N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(m)(1). Having carefully reviewed the record and applicable legal principles, we conclude the agency's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), and that E.C.'s arguments to the contrary are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons set forth in 

DMAHS's final agency decision adopting ALJ Murray's initial decision.
We note only that E.C. argues that because ALJ Murray found L.B. to be credible with respect to the wages she earned while providing services to E.C. prior to her being admitted to a nursing facility, she must find all of L.B.'s testimony regarding her services and expenditures credible. E.C.'s argument overlooks two crucial facts. First, L.B. was specific with respect to the amount she received for her services, allowing ALJ Murray to determine that she received fair market value for her services. There was a lack of specificity, including an absence of receipts, with respect to the expenditures L.B. made on behalf of E.C., making a fair market value determination impossible. Second, it is apparent that ALJ Murray did not find credible L.B.'s testimony that she provided caretaker services to E.C. after she was admitted to a nursing facility. 

9 

A-0832-17T4 

Having listened to and observed L.B. at the hearing, ALJ Murray could accept or reject, in whole or in part, the credibility of L.B.'s testimony. 

Affirmed. 

"Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act" signed, permits qualified terminally ill patient to self-administer medication to end life in humane and dignified manner

"Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act" signed, permits qualified terminally ill patient to self-administer medication to end life in humane and dignified manner

Governor Murphy on 4/12/2019 signed legislation that will allow terminally ill New Jersey adults to end their lives peacefully, with dignity, and at their own discretion. The law, which was sponsored by Assemblyman John Burzichelli and Senator Nick Scutari, makes New Jersey the eighth state to allow such end-of-life decisions with the assistance of medical professionals. 

“Allowing residents with terminal illnesses to make end-of-life choices for themselves is the right thing to do,” said Governor Murphy. “By signing this law today, we are providing terminally ill patients and their families with the humanity, dignity, and respect that they so richly deserve at the most difficult times any of us will face. I commend Assemblyman Burzichelli for steering us down this long, difficult road, and thank the Legislature for its courage in tackling this challenging issue.”

The law will take effect on August 1, 2019.

“Over the course of seven years, we’ve heard countless heartbreaking stories of terminally ill patients and their families yearning to make a personal choice that simply was not provided for under law,” said Assemblyman John Burzichelli. “The choice for patients, who are critically ill and with a short life expectancy prescribed by their doctors, to determine their final day on this earth with dignity deserved honest and intellectual discussion. I’ve had many, many conversations with religious and non-profit organizations such as Compassion and Choices of New Jersey to get their take on the legislation. I thank all who have contributed over the years to the open dialogue, for and against it, and to the Governor for giving it the attention it deserved. It’s been a long, learned discussion, one that I’m sure will continue as we move forward today.”

“This will provide a humane choice for terminally-ill patients who are experiencing tremendous suffering and pain. It offers the freedom of choice for those with no hope of surviving beyond six months to end their suffering in a dignified way,” said Senate President Steve Sweeney. “It is a very personal decision. I watched someone I loved suffer for the last six months of her life from cancer while her children watched. Her suffering was prolonged to a point where she entered a hospice where her medications were increased until she passed away. I don’t think that was humane for her or for her loved ones. This will offer patients in end-of-life circumstances an option to decide their own fate in their final days.”

“There is no good reason for terminally ill patients to be forced to endure prolonged pain and suffering if they make the choice to end their lives with dignity,” said Senator Nicholas P. Scutari. “This law respects the free will of terminally ill patients and provides a humane and dignified process for those qualified to end their lives. I am very proud of New Jersey to support this law and the compassion it provides to those suffering.”

“There are many strong opinions on this issue, but the truth is, only these patients understand what it is like to know death is approaching,” said Assemblyman Joe Danielsen. “This law will give terminally ill patients the choice to meet their end on their own terms. This is the humane approach. We cannot prevent them from dying, but we can at least provide the option and let them to do it with dignity.”

The “Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act” permits terminally ill, adult patients residing in New Jersey to obtain and self-administer medication to end their lives peacefully and humanely.  A patient’s attending and consulting physicians must determine that the patient has a life expectancy of six months or less, has the capacity to make health care decisions, and is acting voluntarily, in order for the patient to obtain the medication. The law establishes additional procedures and safeguards that patients, physicians, and other health care professionals must follow before a qualifying patient may legally obtain and self-administer the medication.

 The Assembly Judiciary Committee reports favorably and with committee amendments Assembly Law No. 1504.

      As amended by the committee, this law establishes the “Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act,” which will allow an adult New Jersey resident, who has the capacity to make health care decisions and who has been determined by that individual’s attending and consulting physicians to be terminally ill, to obtain medication that the patient may self-administer to terminate the patient’s life.  Under the law, “terminally ill” is defined to mean the patient is in the terminal stage of an irreversibly fatal illness, disease, or condition with a prognosis, based upon reasonable medical certainty, of a life expectancy of six months or less.

      In order for a terminally ill patient to receive a prescription for medication under the law, the patient is required to make two oral requests and one written request to the patient’s attending physician for the medication.  The law requires at least 15 days to elapse between the initial oral request and the second oral request, and between the patient’s initial oral request and the writing of a prescription for the medication.  The patient may submit the written request for medication either when the patient makes the initial oral request, or at any time thereafter, but a minimum of 48 hours are to elapse between the attending physician’s receipt of the written request and the writing of a prescription for medication.

      When a patient makes an initial oral request for medication under the law’s provisions, the attending physician is required to provide the patient with information about the risks, probable results, and alternatives to taking the medication; recommend that the patient participate in a consultation concerning concurrent or additional treatment opportunities, palliative care, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control options; and refer the patient to a health care professional who is qualified to discuss those alternative care and treatment options. The patient may choose, but is not required, to participate in such consultation.  The attending physician is also required to recommend that the patient notify the patient’s next of kin of the request, but medication may not be denied if a patient declines, or is unable to, provide this notification.

      The attending physician is required to refer the patient to a consulting physician for the purpose of obtaining confirmation of the attending physician’s diagnosis.  Both the attending physician and the consulting physician are required to verify that the patient has made an informed decision when requesting medication under the law.  When the patient makes the second oral request, the attending physician is to offer the patient an opportunity to rescind the request.  In addition, the attending physician is required to notify the patient that a request may be rescinded at any time and in any manner, regardless of the patient’s mental state.

      A patient may make a written request for medication, in accordance with the law’s provisions, so long as the patient:  is an adult resident of New Jersey, as demonstrated through documentation submitted to the attending physician; is capable; is terminally ill, as determined by the attending physician and confirmed by the consulting physician; and has voluntarily expressed a wish to receive a prescription for the medication.

      The law requires a valid written request for medication to be in a form that is substantially similar to the form set forth in the law.  The law requires the written request to be signed and dated by the patient and witnessed by at least two individuals who attest, in the patient’s presence, that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, the patient is capable and is acting voluntarily.

      The law requires at least one of the witnesses to be a person who is not:

      (1)  a relative of the qualified patient by blood, marriage, or adoption;

      (2)  at the time the request is signed, entitled to any portion of the patient’s estate upon the patient’s death; 

      (3)  an owner, operator, or employee of a health care facility, other than a long term care facility, where the patient is receiving medical treatment or is a resident.

      The patient's attending physician may not serve as a witness.

      A written request form will be required to include an indication as to whether the patient has informed the patient’s next-of-kin about the request for medication and an indication as to whether concurrent or additional treatment consultations have been recommended by the attending physician or undertaken by the patient.

      If the patient complies with the law’s oral and written request requirements, establishes State residency, and is found by both the attending physician and a consulting physician to be capable, to have a terminal illness, and to be acting voluntarily, the patient will be considered to be a “qualified terminally ill patient” who is eligible to receive a prescription for medication.  The law expressly provides that a person is not be considered to be a “qualified terminally ill patient” solely on the basis of the person’s age or disability or the diagnosis of a specific illness, disease, or condition.

      If either the attending physician or the consulting physician believes that the patient may lack capacity to make health care decisions, the physician will be required to refer the patient to a mental health care professional, which is defined in the amended law to mean a licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social worker, for a consultation to determine whether the patient is capable.  If such a referral is made, the attending physician is prohibited from issuing a prescription to the patient for medication under the law unless the attending physician has received written notice, from the mental health care professional, affirming that the patient is capable.

      Prior to issuing a prescription for requested medication, the attending physician is required to ensure that all appropriate steps have been carried out, and requisite documentation submitted, in accordance with the law’s provisions.  The patient's medical record is to include documentation of:  the patient’s oral and written requests and the attending physician’s offer to rescind the request; the attending physician’s recommendation for concurrent or alternative care and treatment consultations, and whether the patient participated in a consultation; the attending physician’s and consulting physician’s medical diagnosis and prognosis, and their determinations that the patient is terminally ill, is capable of making the request, is acting voluntarily, and is making an informed decision; the results of any counseling sessions with a mental health care professional ordered for the patient; and a statement that all the requirements under the law have been satisfied.

      A patient's request for, or the provision of, medication in compliance with the law will not constitute abuse or neglect of an elderly person, and may not be used as the sole basis for the appointment of a guardian or conservator.  The law specifies that a patient’s guardian, conservator, or representative is not authorized to take any action on behalf of the patient in association with the making or rescinding of requests for medication under the law’s provisions, except to communicate the patient’s own health care decisions to a health care provider upon the patient’s request.  The law prohibits any contract, will, insurance policy, annuity, or other agreement from including a provision that conditions or restricts a person’s ability to make or rescind a request for medication pursuant to the law, and further specifies that the procurement or issuance of, or premiums or rates charged for, life, health, or accident insurance policies or annuities may not be conditioned upon the making or rescinding of a request for medication under the law’s provisions.  An obligation owing under a contract, will, insurance policy, annuity, or other agreement executed before the law’s effective date will not be affected by a patient’s request, or rescission of a request, for medication under the law.

      Any person who, without the patient’s authorization, willfully alters or forges a request for medication pursuant to the law, or conceals or destroys a rescission of that request, with the intent or effect of causing the patient's death, will be guilty of a crime of the second degree, which is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to 10 years, a fine of up to $150,000, or both.  A person who coerces or exerts undue influence on a patient to request medication under the law, or to destroy a rescission of a request, will be guilty of a crime of the third degree, which is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to five years, a fine of up to $15,000, or both.  The law does not impose any limit on liability for civil damages in association with the negligence or intentional misconduct of any person.

      The amended law provides immunity from civil and criminal liability, from professional disciplinary action, and from censure, discipline, suspension, or loss of any licensure, certification, privileges, or membership for any action that is undertaken in compliance with the law, including the act of being present when a qualified terminally ill patient takes the medication prescribed to the patient under the law’s provisions.  As amended, the law provides that this immunity also applies to any refusal to take actions in furtherance of, or to otherwise participate in, a request for medication made under the law.  Any action undertaken in accordance with the law will not be deemed to constitute patient abuse or neglect, suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing, euthanasia, or homicide under any State law, and the law expressly exempts actions taken pursuant to the law from the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-6, which makes it a crime to purposely aid a person in committing suicide.  These immunities will not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct.  Nothing in the law is to be construed to authorize a physician or other person to end a patient's life by lethal injection, active euthanasia, or mercy killing.

      The law amends section 1 of P.L.1991, c.270 (C.2A:62A-16), which establishes a “duty to warn” when a health care professional believes that a patient intends to carry out physical violence against the patient’s own self or against another person, in order to specify that that “duty to warn” provisions are not applicable when a qualified terminally ill patient requests medication under the law.

      The law requires a patient’s attending physician to notify the patient of the importance of taking the prescribed medication in the presence of another person and in a non-public place.  The law specifies that, if any governmental entity incurs costs as a result of a patient’s self-administration of medication in a public place, the governmental entity will have a claim against the patient’s estate to recover those costs, along with reasonable attorney fees.

      The law authorizes attending physicians, if registered with the federal Drug Enforcement Administration, to dispense requested medication, including ancillary medication designed to minimize discomfort, directly to the patient.  Otherwise, the attending physician may transmit the prescription to a pharmacist, who will dispense the medication directly to the patient, to the attending physician, or to an expressly identified agent of the patient.  Medication prescribed under the law may not be dispensed by mail or other form of courier.   Not later than 30 days after the dispensation of medication under the law, the health care professional who dispensed the medication will be required to file a copy of the dispensing record with the Division of Consumer Affairs (Division) in the Department of Law and Public Safety.

      Any medication prescribed under the law, which the patient chooses not to self-administer, is required to be disposed of by lawful means.  Lawful means includes, but is not limited to, disposing of the medication consistent with State and federal guidelines concerning disposal of prescription medications or surrendering the medication to a prescription medication drop-off receptacle.  No later than 30 days after the patient’s death, the attending physician will be required to transmit documentation of the patient’s death to the Division.  The Division is required, to the extent practicable, to coordinate the reporting of dispensing records and records of patient death with the process used for the reporting of prescription monitoring information.  The Division will be required to annually prepare and make available on its Internet website a statistical report of information collected pursuant to the law’s provisions; information made available to the public will not include personal or identifying information. 

      A health care facility’s existing policies and procedures will be required, to the maximum extent possible, to govern actions taken by health care providers pursuant to the law.  Any action taken by a health care professional or facility to carry out the provisions of the law is to be voluntary.  If a health care professional is unable or unwilling to participate in a request for medication under the law, the professional will be required to refer the patient to another health care provider and provide the patient’s medical records to that provider.

      This law was pre-filed for introduction in the 2018-2019 session pending technical review.  As reported, the law includes the changes required by technical review, which has been performed.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS:

      The committee amendments clarify that patients are to be advised of both concurrent and additional treatment opportunities, as well as palliative care, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control, when making a request for aid in dying medication under the law.

      The committee amendments provide that licensed clinical social workers will be permitted to make a determination as to whether a patient has the capacity to make health care decisions; as introduced, the law provided that only licensed psychiatrists and psychologists could make this determination.  The committee amendments additionally add a new definition of “mental health care professional,” which includes licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers, and add a provision requiring the State Board of Social Work Examiners to adopt rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the law.  The committee amendments remove references concerning the referral of a patient to a mental health care professional if the attending or consulting physician thinks the patient may have a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression that causes impaired judgment; as amended, the law provides for such referrals when the attending or consulting physician thinks the patient may lack the capacity to make health care decisions.  The law removes a definition of “counseling,” and various references to the term, that are obviated by these amendments.  

      The committee amendments revise the definition of “self-administer” to clarify that the term will not be limited to ingesting the aid in dying medication, but will instead apply to the physical administration of the medication to the patient’s own self.

      The committee amendments remove a provision that would have required that, if the patient is a resident in a long term care facility, a designated staff member of the facility is required to be one of the witnesses to the patient’s written request.  The committee amendments further provide an exception to the prohibition against an owner, operator, or employee of a health care facility from being a witness to the patient’s written request, to provide that this prohibition will not apply when the patient is a resident of a long term care facility.  The law defines “long term care facility” to mean a licensed nursing home, assisted living residence, comprehensive personal care home, residential health care facility, or dementia care home.

      The committee amendments remove certain language concerning when a patient has provided written consent for the patient’s attending physician to contact a pharmacist regarding a prescription for aid in dying medication; the law expressly provides elsewhere that the patient may provide such written consent when completing the written consent form, making the additional reference to the consent redundant. 

      The committee amendments clarify that the means of lawfully disposing of unused aid in dying medication may include disposal consistent with State and federal guidelines concerning the disposal of prescription medications or surrender to a prescription medication drop-off receptacle.

      The committee amendments provide that, in addition to immunity from civil and criminal liability and professional disciplinary action, a person may not be subject to censure, discipline, suspension, or loss of any licensure, certification, privileges, or membership for any action taken in compliance with the law.  The committee amendments further provide that these protections also apply to the refusal to take any action in furtherance of, or to otherwise participate in, a request for medication under the law.

      The committee amendments clarify that, in addition to not constituting patient abuse or neglect, suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing, or homicide, actions taken in connection with a request for medication under the law will not constitute euthanasia.  

      The committee amendments provide that, in addition to not providing the sole basis for the appointment of a guardian or conservator, a patient’s request for, or the provision of, medication under the law will not constitute abuse or neglect of an elderly person.

      The committee amendments provide that the immunities and protections established under the law do not apply to acts or omissions that constitute gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct.

REQUEST FOR MEDICATION TO END MY LIFE IN A

HUMANE AND DIGNIFIED MANNER

     I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , am an adult of sound mind and a resident of New Jersey.

     I am suffering from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , which my attending physician has determined is a terminal illness, disease, or condition and which has been medically confirmed by a consulting physician.

     I have been fully informed of my diagnosis, prognosis, the nature of medication to be prescribed and potential associated risks, the expected result, and the feasible alternatives, including ¹concurrent or additional treatment opportunities,¹ palliative care, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.

     I request that my attending physician prescribe medication that I may self-administer to end my life in a humane and dignified manner and to contact any pharmacist as necessary to fill the prescription.

INITIAL ONE:

     . . . . I have informed my family of my decision and taken their opinions into consideration.

     . . . . . I have decided not to inform my family of my decision.

     . . . . . I have no family to inform of my decision.

INITIAL ALL THAT APPLY:

     . . . . .My attending physician has recommended that I participate in a consultation concerning ¹concurrent or¹ additional treatment opportunities, palliative care, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control options, and provided me with a referral to a health care professional qualified to discuss these options with me.

     . . . . .I have participated in a consultation concerning ¹concurrent or¹ additional treatment opportunities, palliative care, comfort care, hospice care, and pain control options.

     . . .  I am currently receiving palliative care, comfort care, or hospice care.

     I understand that I have the right to rescind this request at any time.

     I understand the full import of this request, and I expect to die if and when I take the medication to be prescribed.  I further understand that, although most deaths occur within three hours, my death may take longer and my physician has counseled me about this possibility.

     I make this request voluntarily and without reservation, and I accept full responsibility for my decision.

Signed:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dated:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLARATION OF WITNESSES

     By initialing and signing below on or after the date the person named above signs, we declare that the person making and signing the above request:

Witness 1        Witness 2

Initials             Initials 

. . . . . . . . .       . . . . . . . . .       

1.  Is personally known to us or has provided proof of identity.

. . . . . . . . .       . . . . . . . . . 

2.  Signed this request in our presence on the date of the person's signature.

. . . . . . . . .       . . . . . . . . .

3.  Appears to be of sound mind and not under duress, fraud, or undue influence.

. . . . . . . . .       . . . . . . . . .

4.  Is not a patient for whom either of us is the attending physician.

. . . . . . . . .       . . . . . . . . .

Printed Name of Witness 1: . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Signature of Witness 1/Date: . . . . . . . . . . . .

Printed Name of Witness 2: . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Signature of Witness 2/Date: . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuts & Bolts of Elder Law & Estate Administration Annual Seminar for Attorneys and professionals involved in Estate Planning

Nuts & Bolts of Elder Law & Estate Administration
May 6, 2019 5:00 PM - 9:00 PM NJ Law Center

Are you looking to expand your practice to be able to offer the legal services required by the elderly and their families in today's society? Those services include will, living will, and trust drafting in addition to estate administration.

This practical program is designed to provide the nuts and bolts of elder law practice and estate administration practice to general practitioners, young lawyers, or those who are just seeking to expand into this growing field as the Baby Boomer Generation, which makes us about half our population, continues to age.

A highly authoritative and experienced panel of elder law attorneys and estate planners will share proven techniques and experience as well as update you on new tax considerations and the latest legal updates.

Learn everything you need to know about elder law and estate administration including:
-Will drafting and the ethics involved
-Powers of Attorney and how to prepare them
-Living Trusts, both revocable and irrevocable, as estate planning tools
-Basic tax considerations under both federal and state law
-Estate Administration including duties of executors/fiduciaries and tax returns
-Medicaid Planning

Includes a bonus 240+ page handbook, plus sample forms, document, and checklists!

Moderator/Speaker
Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq.
K. Vercammen & Associates
Edison, NJ

Honorable Katie A. Gummer
Presiding Judge General Equity
Monmouth County, NJ

Martin A. Spigner, Esq.
Law Office of Martin A. Spigner
Cranbury, NJ

Pamela A. Quattrone, Esquire, MBA
Rice Elder Law
Cherry Hill, NJ

NJ Law Center
1 Constitution Square
New Brunswick, NJ 08901

More details contact New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education. The non-profit continuing education service of The New Jersey State Bar Association 
Constitution Square, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901-1520
Phone: (732) 214-8500
CustomerService@njicle.com

Attorneys cost to attend $180 pre-reg, $200 at the door
Presented in cooperation with the NJSBA Elder & Disability Law Section and NJSBA Young Lawyers Division

Law students can attend for free if pre-registered and space still available without materials

Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/events/171117760439349/

Court should not terminate trust if that would be contrary to testator’s intent IN RE: the ESTATE OF William BONARDI.

Court should not terminate trust if that would be contrary to testator’s intent

IN RE: the ESTATE OF William BONARDI.

Superior Court of New Jersey,Appellate Division.

IN RE: the ESTATE OF William BONARDI.

    Decided: April 05, 2005

Before Judges PARRILLO, GRALL and RIVA.  Robert F. Binetti, Ridgefield, argued the cause for appellant, the Estate of William Bonardi. Patrick J. Jennings, Hackensack, argued the cause for respondent, Donna Bonardi.  Jeffrey C. Mason argued the cause for respondents, Danielle Bonardi and Jessica Bonardi.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, certified as final, Rule 4:42-2, permitting termination of a testamentary trust.   For the following reasons, we reverse.

William Bonardi died testate on March 9, 2002, survived by his wife, Donna, and his two daughters, Danielle and Jessica.   At the time of his death, Danielle was eighteen-years old and Jessica was sixteen-years old.   Although decedent's Will included some specific bequests to other individuals, his wife and two daughters were the primary beneficiaries under separate testamentary trusts, each made up of one-half of the residuary estate.   Stephen F. Pellino, decedent's friend, was named Executor of decedent's estate and Trustee of the two testamentary trusts.

The first trust named plaintiff, Donna Bonardi, as the income beneficiary and devised the remainder to Danielle and Jessica.   The second trust named the daughters as the only beneficiaries.   In both instances, the daughters were not entitled to outright distribution of their interest before they reached the age of twenty-five.

Under the first trust, plaintiff's interest was subject to several terms and conditions.   Paragraph TENTH of decedent's Will reads, in pertinent part:

For the duration of the life of my wife, DONNA, the Trustee shall pay her or apply towards her benefit, all of the net income of this trust.   In addition, the Trustee may pay to her or apply to her benefit such amounts of the principal of the Trust as the Trustee, in the exercise of the Trustee's absolute discretion, deems advisable for her welfare.   In deciding to make such distributions of principal to or for DONNA'S benefit, the Trustee shall be guided by the following statement of my purposes and intentions:  It is my expectation that the trust income and principal will not be made available to provide primary support for the beneficiary, as I expect that DONNA in complete or large  measure will support herself.   I further direct that my Trustee shall, to the extent possible, not make payments to DONNA out of principal unless necessary, and that he rather seek to preserve the corpus, to the extent possible, for ultimate distribution to my children or survivor of them.   My Trustee shall have complete authority to make these determinations which I direct shall not be subject to legal challenge.   In making determinations as to distributions of principal for DONNA'S benefit, I ask that my Trustee be mindful of the standard of living that we maintained during my lifetime.

[emphasis supplied.].

Explaining the limitations imposed pursuant to this paragraph, Pellino certified that decedent had expected his wife, who had gone to school and obtained a nursing degree during the marriage, to work in the nursing field on a full-time basis after his death.   According to Pellino, decedent was also concerned about “his wife's inappropriate use of alcohol” and feared “that if the estate's assets were left to Donna outright, she would continue to lead this lifestyle which he felt was inappropriate, unhealthy and against his wishes.”   Further, decedent “did not want the proceeds of his hard work to be used for the benefit of any future boyfriend or husband that Donna might choose.”   None of these concerns, however, was expressly addressed by a spendthrift provision in the trust or anywhere else in the Will.

Even so, decedent evidenced his intent elsewhere in the Will. Notably, paragraph ELEVENTH, which concerned the daughters' trust, provided that “the trust income and principal will not be made available for primary support for the beneficiary as I expect that my wife will contribute to their support․” Further, paragraph TWELFTH granted the Trustee the exclusive right to “deal with [the] corpus and the income of such trusts.”   Only if the accumulated income from the trust was insufficient could the Trustee invade the principal.

A dispute eventually arose between plaintiff and the Executor/Trustee over the amount necessary for plaintiff's support.   Plaintiff claimed that because she was only able to work part-time due to chronic medical problems, her living expenses exceeded her income, including the amounts made available to her by the Trustee under the first testamentary trust.   Essentially, she  complained that Pellino was improperly withholding principal necessary for her support and requested immediate distribution of all principal in the trust.

While acknowledging that plaintiff's payments from the trust had decreased over time, Pellino insisted the reductions were necessary to preserve the corpus and carry out the trust's purpose.   He explained that he initially allowed plaintiff to control all the finances in order to ease the transition after her husband's death, and that he paid her $8,000 per month when he first took over as Trustee, but that she was advised the payments would be reduced because she was expected to work and contribute towards her own support.   As significantly, Pellino certified that the net monthly income from Donna's trust was only $2,845, yet he was paying plaintiff $4,545 per month, thereby depleting the principal by as much as $1,700 per month.   Pellino also disputed plaintiff's assertion that she could only work part-time, stating that she had “resisted any discussion of where she works, how much she earns, how many hours she works, and why she is unable to earn more.”

On account of this impasse, on December 16, 2003, plaintiff filed an action in the Chancery Division to compel formal accountings of her husband's estate and the testamentary trust created on her behalf, and to direct the immediate distribution to her of all net income as well as principal held pursuant to that trust necessary to maintain the marital standard of living.   Simultaneously, decedent's two daughters filed a separate complaint, also seeking a formal estate accounting and distribution of income and/or principal from the second trust created under their father's Will for their exclusive benefit.   On the return date of the orders to show cause, the trial judge issued a consolidated order requiring the Executor to provide an informal accounting by March 15, 2004, and to examine the financial requests of the beneficiaries “in the context of their needs and the intent of the testator.”   Pursuant to that order, Pellino rendered a timely accounting, and plaintiffs' counsel was given an opportunity to examine all of the estate's financial records.   Sometime thereafter, the two complaints were  consolidated and the action proceeded on the respective claims for distribution under a single docket number.

On May 12, 2004, Danielle and Jessica Bonardi executed a waiver of their remainder interest in the trust established on behalf of their mother so that the corpus could be immediately distributed to her.   Pellino, however, refused to accept the waiver.   As a result, the daughters filed a motion to terminate the testamentary trust, supported by certifications stating they understood they would inherit one-half of the trust principal upon their mother's death, but believed it was in their best interest if the trust were terminated and the corpus made immediately available to their mother. At the time, both daughters were living with their mother and under the age of twenty-five: Danielle, being only twenty years old, and Jessica, eighteen.

Following oral argument, the judge granted the motion and terminated the testamentary trust, directing distribution of the daughters' remainder interest in trust principal to plaintiff, Donna Bonardi.   Mistakenly believing that “all beneficiaries [were] at least twenty-one years old,” the judge reasoned in part:

New Jersey permits the termination of a trust upon consent of all beneficiaries (even if the trust is discretionary) where the income beneficiary is different from the remainder beneficiary.  6 Clapp, New Jersey Practice:  Wills and Administration § 543 (3d ed.1982).   This is so because the testator did not establish the trust because of an especial lack of confidence in the income beneficiary's ability to manage the fund.  Id. Instead, the testator may possibly have wished to save estate and inheritance taxes on the income beneficiary's death, or he may have had some other motive.  Id. In any event, there being no other manifestation of intention in the Will bearing on the subject, the testator probably would not object if all the beneficiaries consent to the termination of the trust.   3 Scott, Trusts § 337.1.

On appeal, the Executor/Trustee maintains, among other things, that termination of the testamentary trust frustrates and defeats the express intent of the testator and is, therefore, impermissible.   He further argues that the judge's finding that the testator's probable intent was to the contrary was unsupported by the evidence and constituted error.   We agree with those contentions and reverse.

  It is well-settled that a court's primary function is to enforce the testator's expressed intent with respect to a testamentary trust. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Margetts, 7 N.J. 556, 566, 82 A.2d 191 (1951);  In re Ransom Testamentary Trust, 180 N.J.Super. 108, 117, 433 A.2d 834 (Law Div.1981);  Cinnaminson Tp. v. First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 99 N.J.Super. 115, 127, 238 A.2d 701 (Ch.Div.1968).   Our duty is to “uphold testamentary dispositions of property, made through the medium of trusts, instead of searching for reasons for avoiding them, or dealing with them with any degree of disfavor.”  Fidelity Union, supra, 7 N.J. at 565, 82 A.2d 191 (internal citation omitted).   In this regard, the whole will must be examined to ascertain the purpose of the testator.  Ibid.

 To be sure, all the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust can consent to the trust's termination if none of them is under an incapacity and continuance of the trust is no longer necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust.  Fidelity Union, supra, 7 N.J. at 566, 82 A.2d 191;  In re Ransom Testamentary Trust, supra, 180 N.J.Super. at 120, 433 A.2d 834;  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 337 (1959).   Thus, if all of the purposes of the trust have been carried out, or if the only purpose remaining unfulfilled is to confer upon certain beneficiaries interests successively in possession and in remainder, then all persons in interest, if they are sui juris, may jointly compel termination of the trust.  Bd. of Dir. of Ajax Electrothermic Corp. v. First Nat'l. Bank of Princeton, 33 N.J. 456, 465, 165 A.2d 513 (1960) (Ajax II );  6 Alfred C. Clapp et al., New Jersey Practice Series § 543 (3d Ed.1982).

 On the other hand:

If a trust is created for successive beneficiaries and it is not the only purpose of the trust to give the beneficial interest in the trust property to one beneficiary for a designated period and to preserve the principal for the other beneficiary, but there are other purposes of the trust which have not been fully accomplished, the trust will not be terminated merely because both of the beneficiaries desire to terminate it, or one of them acquires the interest of the other.

[Restatement (Second) of Trusts, supra, § 337 comment g.].

 Indeed, one of the conditions which must exist before a trust will be accelerated or terminated, even upon application of all the parties in interest, “is that every reasonable ultimate purpose of the trust's creation and existence has been accomplished and that no fair and lawful restriction imposed by the testator will be nullified or disturbed by such a result.”   Fidelity Union, supra, 7 N.J. at 570, 82 A.2d 191.

Even where the beneficiary is the sole party in interest and of full age, and the trust is not a spendthrift trust, the beneficiary may not automatically have it terminated, irrespective of the creator's intention.   Where, for instance, the trustee has active duties, the trust is not terminable as a matter of right at the demand of the beneficiary, even though the beneficiary is given the disposition at death.  Id. at 564, 82 A.2d 191.

 Further, spendthrift trusts, trusts for support of a beneficiary, and discretionary trusts cannot be terminated by consent of the beneficiaries.   Restatement (Second) of Trusts, supra, § 337 at comments l, m, and n. This is because the material purpose of a spendthrift trust is to prevent anticipation or control of future income or corpus by the protected income beneficiary and, therefore, acceleration of the trust would directly contravene the testator's intent.  Heritage Bank-North, N.A. v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 164 N.J.Super. 33, 36, 395 A.2d 552 (App.Div.1978).   Moreover, “even if not of an express spendthrift nature, a trust nevertheless created for the primary purpose of ensuring the beneficiary's support and maintenance is not terminable by consent since such termination would obviously also contravene testamentary intent.”  Ibid. And, the fact that a trustee has the power to invade the corpus for the beneficiary's benefit does not negate a testator's intent to establish such a trust.  Id. at 37, 395 A.2d 552.   In short, “[t]he question for determination is whether the settlor had any other purpose in mind than to enable the beneficiaries to successively enjoy the trust property.”  Baer v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 264, 266, 31 A.2d 823 (E & A 1943).

  Here, a material purpose of the trust not only still remains, but would be soundly defeated by the daughters' renunciation of trust corpus in favor of their mother, the income beneficiary whose right to principal was expressly limited under the terms of the trust.   First and foremost, the request is not simply to terminate the trust and accelerate distribution to the intended successive beneficiaries, but quite the opposite, to divest the remaindermen of their interest and divert the trust corpus instead to the income beneficiary.   This, however, is directly contrary to the express testamentary plan, evident from the face of the language of the Will itself.   As stated in paragraph EIGHTH and provided for in paragraph TENTH, the clear purpose of the trust is to preserve the corpus for the ultimate benefit of decedent's daughters “per stirpes and not per capita.”   Thus, if one or both of the daughters were to predecease plaintiff, their children-decedent's grandchildren-would acquire their mother's interest in the trust.   However, if the relief requested were to be granted, not only would Danielle and Jessica be divested of their remainder interest, but the rights of the putative grandchildren would be defeated as well, cf.  In re Estate of Branigan, 129 N.J. 324, 609 A.2d 431 (1992), thereby frustrating the testator's clear intent.   Plainly, in this instance, acceleration and termination of the trust would have resulted in a distribution to a person other than those intended by the testator.   Cf. Ajax Electrothermic Corp. v. First Nat. Bank of Princeton, 7 N.J. 82, 87-88, 80 A.2d 559 (1951) (Ajax I ).

Another purpose of the trust, evidenced in paragraph TENTH, was to provide supplemental support and maintenance for plaintiff without making trust income and principal “available to provide primary support.”   Rather, the announced expectation was that plaintiff would “in complete and large measure” support herself and “contribute to [the daughters'] support as may be appropriate to their age and circumstance from time to time.”   In fact, payments out of principal were not to be made to plaintiff unless absolutely necessary for her welfare.   And, in making this determination, the trustee was vested with “absolute discretion.”   Indeed, the express terms of the Will divested plaintiff of actual control over the estate's assets.   Thus, the creation of a trust with “complete authority” in a trustee evidences testator's plain intent to deny plaintiff immediate distribution of, or control over, distribution of trust corpus.   See Heritage Bank, supra, 164 N.J.Super. at 37, 395 A.2d 552.

It also demonstrates the testator's intent to insulate trust principal from any control exerted by the daughters during their mother's lifetime.   The language of paragraph EIGHTH, which states that neither Danielle nor Jessica is entitled to her respective remainder share before she reaches the age of twenty-five, supports this construction.   By selecting a specific age as the earliest time at which his daughters may receive outright distribution of principal, the testator implicitly negated their ability to affect the trust before then.   Yet, when Danielle and Jessica made the mutual decision to renounce their respective remainder interests, they were only twenty and eighteen years of age respectively, living with their mother, and presumably still under her influence.   Cf. Archard v. Mesmer, 110 N.J.Super. 560, 562, 266 A.2d 314 (App.Div.1970) (holding that mutual promises, unsupported by valuable consideration, to equally divide expected interests in an estate will ordinarily not be enforced because they thwart the plain wishes of the testator and are fraught with opportunities for fraud).   Clearly, such decision-making by those otherwise ineligible under the explicit terms of the Will contravenes the testator's plain intent.   And, the expressed wishes of the testator to preserve trust corpus for the benefit of his children or their survivors simply cannot be reconciled with the family settlement struck in this case that achieves diametrically opposite results.   The named remaindermen not having yet attained the age to exert control over the trust corpus, a material purpose of the trust still exists and would be completely frustrated by its premature termination and distribution of principal to plaintiff, an unintended beneficiary.

 Plaintiff's reliance on Ajax II, supra, to justify the relief sought in this case is misplaced.  Ajax II dealt with a situation exactly opposite of that presented herein, involving not a renunciation by the remaindermen, but rather a waiver by a life tenant who was entitled to a fixed monthly disbursement.  33 N.J. at 460, 165 A.2d 513.   In return for her release of her $150 per month life interest in the trust, the corporate remainderman established an annuity that provided the life tenant with a benefit greater than that which she was receiving under the testamentary trust.  Ibid. The Court found this circumstance consistent with the testator's intention and, therefore, sufficient to justify acceleration and termination of the trust so that the intended beneficiaries could immediately receive distribution of the corpus.  Id. at 469, 165 A.2d 513.   Here, of course, the relief requested would not result in an accelerated distribution of trust corpus to the intended beneficiaries, but rather a diversion of principal to someone expressly ineligible under the trust.

We disagree with the trial court's construction of the Will to the contrary.   We find no basis in the record, or in the rather plain language of the testamentary instrument, for the judge's conclusions that the testator “did not establish the trust because of an especial lack of confidence in the income beneficiary's ability to manage the fund[,]” and that “the testator may possibly have wished to save estate and inheritance taxes on the income beneficiary's death, or he may have had some other motive.”   The former, in fact, is belied by the record evidence and the latter amounts to no more than rank speculation.   Although we are sensitive to the deference to which the trial court's findings are entitled, that deference is predicated upon adequate evidentiary support for those findings.  Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).   Our review of the record constrains us to conclude that the evidence did not warrant the determination that “the testator probably would not object if all the beneficiaries consent to termination of the trust.”

 We are convinced of just the opposite.   The relief requested here defeats the testamentary plan, evidenced from the face of the instrument itself, and contravenes the expressed wishes of the testator.

Reversed.

PARRILLO, J.A.D.

Woodbridge Library Wills, Estate Planning & Probate Seminar

       Woodbridge Library

Wills, Estate Planning & Probate Seminar

Woodbridge Public Library (1 George Frederick Plaza) – Monday March 13^th, 2019 at 7 PM

WILLS & ESTATE ADMINISTRATION- PROTECT YOUR FAMILY AND MAKE PLANNING EASY Free program open to the public, you do not need to be a Township resident to attend

SPEAKER: Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Edison, (Author-Wills and Estate Administration by the ABA)

   

Main Topics:

1. NJ Estate Tax eliminated in 2018 

2. The 2019 changes in Federal Estate and Gift Tax 

3. Power of Attorneys recommendations

4. Living Will & Advance Directive      

5. Administering the Estate/ Probate/Surrogate

6. Avoiding unnecessary expenses

       

COMPLIMENTARY MATERIAL: Brochures on Wills, "Answers to Questions about Probate" and Administration of an Estate, Power of Attorney, Living Wills, Real Estate Sales for Seniors, and Trusts.     

For info call 732-634-4450

Facebook

https://www.facebook.com/events/410281549779897/