IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL D. JONES, A-2944-21

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL D. JONES, Deceased. __________________________ Submitted September 13, 2023 – Decided November 14, 2023 Before Judges Haas, Gooden Brown and Natali. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. P- 000005-20. NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2944-21The opinion of the Court was delivered by GOODEN BROWN, J.A.D. In this probate dispute, defendant Jeanine Jones appeals from an April 23, 2021 order granting partial summary judgment and dismissing her creditor's claim against the estate of her deceased ex-husband, Michael Jones. The creditor's claim arose from a 2017 divorce settlement agreement (DSA) between APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION November 14, 2023 APPELLATE DIVISION Jeanine and Michael.1 Jeanine also appeals from an August 3, 2021 order denying her motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.2 I. We glean these facts from the motion record. Jeanine and Michael were married in 1990, separated in 2016, and divorced in 2018. During their eighteen- month period of separation, Jeanine and Michael attempted to reconcile in accordance with certain stipulations. In her deposition, Jeanine testified that the stipulations included the parties attending couples counseling and Michael making payments to her as recompense for his financial shortcomings as a husband during the marriage. Although Michael made three payments to Jeanine between June and August 2017, totaling $12,000, the parties never attended counseling and the reconciliation ultimately failed. 1 Due to the common surname, we use first names to avoid confusion and intend no disrespect. 2 In her amended notice of appeal, Jeanine also lists an April 13, 2022 order denying her request for reimbursement from the estate for expenses allegedly incurred on behalf of the estate and directing her to pay the estate the sum of $27,862.70. However, because Jeanine makes no supporting legal argument in her merits brief regarding the April 13 order, all issues as to that order are deemed waived. See N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) ("An issue that is not briefed is deemed waived upon appeal."). 2 A-2944-21 The couple divorced by entry of a January 17, 2018 final judgment of divorce (JOD), which incorporated a DSA executed on October 19, 2017. According to the DSA, Michael agreed to pay Jeanine the sum of $200,000 according to the following payment schedule: (a) Thursday, October 19, 2017, [Michael] will deliver a personal check to [Jeanine in the amount of] $4,500[] upon receipt of th[e] notarized [DSA]. (b) Tuesday, November 20, 2017, [Michael] has agreed to deliver a second check to [Jeanine] in the amount of $45,500[]. (c) The remaining balance of $150,000[] shall be delivered to [Jeanine] over the next three years beginning 2018. Each payment shall be in the amount of $50,000[], payable by the end of each year ending December 2020. As to equitable distribution, the DSA provided that "[u]pon full execution of th[e DSA], [Michael] shall . . . have sole possession (title) of the [m]arital [r]esidence. However, should [Michael] sell the [m]arital [r]esidence prior to December 31, 2020, he must pay the balance remaining of the $200,000[], in full." If Michael predeceased Jeanine, the DSA stated that "the proceeds from [Michael's] estate will compensate [Jeanine] for the remainder of the $200,000[] in the event there is an unpaid balance." If the couple reconciled after the divorce, Jeanine would not be obligated to "return any settlement agreement monies paid by [Michael]." 3 A-2944-21 Under the DSA, "[a]ny marital asset not listed . . . belong[ed] to the party who ha[d] it . . . in their possession" at the time of the DSA's execution. The DSA also granted each party "exclusive use, possession, and ownership of all items titled in [their respective name] solely including cash on hand, [and] cash in banks." Specifically, as to the couple's respective retirement and bank accounts, the DSA provided that each party would retain "exclusive use, possession, and ownership of any 401k, IRA, or other retirement account listed in [his or her] name" and each party would forever relinquish any right he or she may have to the other's accounts, except that Jeanine's interest was permanently relinquished only if Michael "ha[d] fulfilled his financial obligation[s] by December 31, 2020." The DSA similarly stated that each party would retain "exclusive use, possession, and ownership and shall be the sole owner of any bank account listed in [his or her] name, including, but not limited to, checking accounts, savings accounts, or money market accounts," but Michael's promise was again conditioned on whether he "ha[d] fulfilled his financial obligation by December 31, 2020." The DSA further specified that "[e]ach party, except as otherwise provided in th[e a]greement, release[d] the other from all claims, liabilities, debts, obligations, actions, and causes of action of every kind, whether known or unknown" (the release provision). Additionally, the DSA provided that by 4 A-2944-21 executing the agreement, Jeanine "w[ould] not waive, release[], [or] relinquish[] any actual or potential right, claim, or cause of action against [Michael], including but not limited to asserting a claim against . . . [Michael's] estate . . . except as otherwise provided in th[e DSA] or arising hereunder" (the waiver provision). Jeanine would waive "any and all rights to inherit part of [Michael's estate] at his death, only if [Michael] ha[d] fulfilled his financial obligation on or by December 31, 2020." Finally, the parties agreed that the DSA "constitute[d] the entire contract of the parties" and "supersede[d] any prior understandings or agreements between them." Michael made the scheduled payments in accordance with the DSA through December 2018, amounting to $100,000. On November 1, 2019, Michael delivered a check to Jeanine in the amount of $10,000, which, according to the check's memo line, was intended to be the first of two payments for that year. However, on November 9, 2019, Michael was admitted to the hospital and underwent emergency surgery to treat a perforated gastric ulcer. The surgery was unsuccessful, and on November 14, 2019, Michael was placed into palliative care. On the same day, November 14, 2019, Michael executed a Banking Power of Attorney (the POA) appointing Jeanine as attorney-in-fact, which Jeanine used to withdraw $17,000 from Michael's PNC bank account later that day. 5 A-2944-21 Among other things, the POA authorized Jeanine "to draw, sign and deliver checks or drafts; to withdraw by check, order, draft, wire transfer or otherwise any funds or property . . . deposited with or left in the custody of PNC Bank," and "to do everything necessary in exercising these powers." In her deposition testimony, Jeanine acknowledged that there were no witnesses to Michael's signature on the POA other than Jeanine, and a notary at PNC bank apparently notarized Jeanine's signature, but not Michael's. Michael died intestate two days later on November 16, 2019, at fifty-nine years of age, having paid only $110,000 of the $200,000 sum owed under the DSA. According to her deposition testimony, after Michael's death, Jeanine took it upon herself to organize Michael's funeral, pay his outstanding bills, and maintain the marital home "to [give] the appearance that someone was there and that it was secure" while it remained vacant. To that end, Jeanine paid approximately $1,000 to cover the costs of the church service and funeral programs.3 She also paid the home's gas, electric, and internet bills until June 2020, all of which were "still in her name." In addition, she paid for lawn service, security system installation and maintenance, homeowners' insurance, 3 In her original creditor's claim, Jeanine listed an additional $7,472 payment to the funeral home. However, in her deposition, Jeanine admitted that the funeral home expenses should not have been included in the claim, as she had mistakenly used Michael's PNC debit card to pay that bill. 6 A-2944-21 garbage pickup, storage of Michael's vehicles, and the home's property taxes, all of which totaled $8,820.85. Lastly, Jeanine paid $2,532.86 to cover Michael's medical expenses. At her deposition, Jeanine testified that she had withdrawn the $17,000 from Michael's PNC bank account to "take care of [Michael's] household [expenses]," but the expenses were ultimately "paid with checks" or "electronic payments" that were drawn directly from her own checking account. Jeanine acknowledged that during that time, she went to Michael's house periodically, but she denied moving into the house or removing any items from the home. Nonetheless, Jeanine admitted redeeming a number of U.S. Series EE Bonds that designated her as the pay-on-death (POD) beneficiary, and acknowledged that the bonds were stored in the office of Michael's home. Jeanine received $77,864.40 from redeeming the bonds. On February 14, 2020, plaintiff Shontell Jones, Michael's daughter from a previous relationship, filed an amended complaint and order to show cause seeking, among other things, appointment as the administrator of Michael's estate; a full accounting from Jeanine of all financial transactions involving Michael's accounts at the time of his death; a full accounting of all items Jeanine removed from Michael's home; and an order directing Jeanine to vacate Michael's house, pay the estate rent from the date she took possession, and 7 A-2944-21 reimburse the estate for all utility costs attributable to her occupancy. Jeanine filed a pleading designated as an "[a]nswer, [s]eparate [d]efenses, and [c]ounterclaim," seeking her DSA entitlements.4 In a June 12, 2020 order, plaintiff was appointed administrator of Michael's estate. The June 12 order also granted plaintiff's request for a full accounting from Jeanine, and directed Jeanine to vacate Michael's home and pay the estate rent and utility costs for her occupancy.5 Pursuant to the June 12 order, the matter was "converted to a plenary proceeding" and a hearing was scheduled to address Jeanine's entitlements under the DSA. On August 10, 2020, Jeanine filed a creditor's claim against the estate, wherein she claimed that the estate owed her: $100,000 pursuant to the DSA; $19,833.20 as reimbursement for "medical bills, funeral costs and household bills and real estate taxes paid by [her] from [her] personal funds" on the estate's behalf; and "[a]ny portion" of Michael's Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General pension benefits "as determined by [the United States Office of Personnel Management]." In support of her claims, Jeanine submitted an Excel spreadsheet that she claimed was "the most recent 4 None of the pleadings were provided in the record. 5 Notwithstanding her deposition testimony, Jeanine's attorney apparently conceded at a hearing that Jeanine had been residing at Michael's home. The hearing transcript was not provided in the record. 8 A-2944-21 accounting" of Michael's "outstanding obligations to [her]" under the DSA, a "summary of expenses" Jeanine claimed to have made on behalf of the estate, and documents supporting her claim to the pension. On October 22, 2020, the estate filed a notice of rejection of claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:22-7, denying that Jeanine was a creditor of the estate. The estate disputed Jeanine's accounting of payments allegedly made on behalf of the estate, claimed Jeanine actually owed the estate money, and asserted that the DSA had already been satisfied because Jeanine had received $216,864.40 from Michael as follows: (1) $17,000 withdrawal from Michael's PNC bank account prior to his death; (2) $122,000 in settlement payments from Michael, including the payments Michael made during the reconciliation period; and (3) $77,864.40 from redeeming Michael's U.S. Series EE Bonds that belonged to Michael but designated Jeanine as the POD beneficiary. After the close of discovery, the estate moved for partial summary judgment on Jeanine's DSA-related claims, asserting that the claims were satisfied by Jeanine's receipt of $216,864.40, including the redemption of the savings bonds. Jeanine opposed the motion, arguing that the bonds were separate and apart from the DSA and should not be credited against her DSA entitlement. According to Jeanine, because the estate had supplied no evidence 9 A-2944-21 of Michael's intentions to contradict Jeanine's attestation that the parties intended the POD designation to survive the divorce, as well as the fact that the DSA was silent on the bonds' disposition, summary judgment was inappropriate. During oral argument conducted on April 23, 2021, the judge observed that "the big question" involved the bonds and posited that Jeanine "want[ed] her $200,000 plus the $77,864." However, in an oral decision, the judge determined that the "amounts already received by [Jeanine] satisf[ied the DSA,]" thereby concluding that the bonds "count[ed]" towards the $200,000 DSA obligation. In that regard, the judge accepted the estate's argument that upon the party's divorce, the bonds' POD designation was presumptively revoked pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14. The judge instructed the estate's counsel to draft an order that "state[d] the six checks to the tune of $122,000, plus the $77,000 . . . in bonds," in addition to the $17,000 that Jeanine had withdrawn from Michael's PNC account "[s]atisfie[d] the $200,000 that was owed under the [DSA]." The judge also directed counsel to indicate that those sums "result[ed] in an overpayment to [Jeanine]" in the amount of $16,864.40, "[w]hich still remain[ed] an open issue." When Jeanine's counsel continued to disagree with the judge's ruling, the judge reiterated: [T]he cashing in of the bonds by [Jeanine] counts towards the money she was owed, the $200,000. . . . 10 A-2944-21 [Jeanine] got her money, she got extra money. So I don't know yet what to do with the extra part. But if what you're saying is that with the inclusion of the $77,000 she's still owed another $100,000[,] well that's a different story, I'm not aware of that, I'd have to go back and look at the divorce decree and say okay, was she supposed to get another $100,000 that she didn't receive[] . . . . So that's what I'm allowing you to still flush out . . . . But if with the inclusion of the $77,000 in bonds she got her $200,000 plus, that may or may not cover what you believe is still owed under the additional $100,000. I don't know. .... Now that's the argument I'm allowing you to preserve if it's somewhere in the divorce decree that I'm not aware of. After the hearing, the estate's counsel submitted a proposed order as instructed, which order was signed by the judge on April 23, 2021, over Jeanine's attorney's objection. The order granted the estate partial summary judgment, dismissed with prejudice Jeanine's creditor's claim that the estate was liable to Jeanine for additional payments under the DSA, and determined that Michael's financial obligations under the DSA were "satisfied in full" by: (1) Michael's payment of $122,000 from June 2017 to November 2019 "in contemplation of and in accordance with the DSA;" (2) Jeanine's withdrawal of $17,000 from Michael's PNC bank account "for her personal use;" and (3) Jeanine's redemption of $77,864.40 in US savings bonds "owned by [Michael]." The 11 A-2944-21 order reserved judgment on the estate's claim for reimbursement of $16,864.40 from Jeanine. Jeanine subsequently moved for reconsideration. During oral argument conducted on August 3, 2021, among other things, Jeanine argued that the judge "overlooked the plain language . . . in the agreement and incorrectly relied upon the federally preempted estate statutes to determine the distribution of the federal bond proceeds." Jeanine asserted "[t]he bonds were not specifically included in the [DSA,]" which "preserve[d Jeanine's] rights to items that [were] expressly outside of the agreement," and "federal regulations would govern distribution of th[e] bonds." The judge rejected Jeanine's argument, explaining: [D]oes the fact that she received, under the bond[s], her $77,000 . . . plus, take care of the rest of what was owed toher?... [M]ydecisionwasthat...thatwaspartof the package . . . because once they were divorced what would have been [Michael's] rational[e] to leave her as beneficiary of those bonds? . . . [T]hat was the basis of my decision because there wasn't anything to counter that. There wasn't anything to tell me that his intention under the divorce settlement agreement was that . . . [Jeanine was] going to stay beneficiary . . . . The agreement itself is fairly comprehensive. It says she gets $200,000. . . . [T]hat's part and parcel of what she got with the bonds and the [$122,000] she got before.... [I]t'snotthatIwassooffbase...thatit was palpably incorrect for me to make that ruling. 12 A-2944-21 The judge concluded Jeanine failed to meet the standard for reconsideration by failing to identify "a palpable error" or "mistake," denied the motion, and entered a memorializing order the same day. A final order requiring Jeanine to pay the estate $27,862.70, and denying Jeanine's request for reimbursement of expenses allegedly incurred on behalf of the estate was subsequently entered on April 13, 2022. This appeal followed. On appeal, Jeanine argues the judge erred in granting partial summary judgment and denying reconsideration. Specifically, Jeanine asserts the judge misapplied federal law and misinterpreted the DSA, which led the judge to mistakenly credit the bond proceeds towards the amount owed to her under the DSA. According to Jeanine, under federal law, the savings bonds were not part of Michael's estate, and federal law preempted any state law to the contrary. Further, Jeanine contends the judge's decisions were based on erroneous assumptions about the DSA that were inconsistent with the agreement's plain language. II. "[W]e review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). That standard is well-settled. 13 A-2944-21 [I]f the evidence of record—the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits—"together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact," then the trial court must deny the motion. On the other hand, when no genuine issue of material fact is at issue and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment must be granted. [Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 366 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).] Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists depends on "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). "We review issues of law de novo and accord no deference to the trial judge's [legal] conclusions . . . ." MTK Food Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 307, 312 (App. Div. 2018). On the other hand, we review a trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration under an abuse of discretion standard. Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. A-2944-21 14 v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is ["]made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.["]'" Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 302 (2020) (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank, 440 N.J. Super. at 382). "Where the order sought to be reconsidered is interlocutory, as in this case, Rule 4:42-2 governs the motion." JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enters., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 160 (App. Div. 2022). "Reconsideration under this rule offers a 'far more liberal approach' than Rule 4:49-2, governing reconsideration of a final order." Ibid. (quoting Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021)). Under Rule 4:42-2, interlocutory orders are "subject to revision at any time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of justice." Lawson, 468 N.J. Super. at 134 (quoting R. 4:42-2(b)); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 4:42-2 (2023) ("[A]n order adjudicating less than all the claims is subject to revision in the interests of justice at any time before entry of final judgment."). In contrast, Rule 4:49-2 "requires a showing that the challenged order was the result of a 'palpably incorrect or irrational' analysis or of the judge's failure to 'consider' or 'appreciate' competent and probative evidence." Lawson, 468 N.J. 15 A-2944-21 Super. at 134 (quoting Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)). Turning to the substantive principles governing this appeal, "[a]n agreement that resolves a matrimonial dispute is no less a contract than an agreement to resolve a business dispute," and, as such, "is governed by basic contract principles." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016). "The interpretation or construction of a contract is generally a legal question . . . ." Petersen v. Twp. of Raritan, 418 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div. 2011). "Accordingly, we pay no special deference to the trial court's interpretation and look at the contract with fresh eyes." JPC Merger, 474 N.J. Super. at 160 (quoting Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011)). "It is well-settled that '[c]ourts enforce contracts "based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the contract."'" [In re Cnty. of Atlantic], 230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 118 (2014)). Contract terms are generally "given their plain and ordinary meaning." M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, 396 (2002). Because "[t]he plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry[,] 'when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.'" [Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 616 (2020)] (quoting [Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45]). "If we conclude that a contractual term is ambiguous, we 'consider the parties' practical construction of the contract as 16 A-2944-21 evidence of their intention and as controlling weight in determining a contract's interpretation.'" Ibid. (quoting [Cnty. of Atlantic], 230 N.J. at 255). [JPC Merger, 474 N.J. Super. at 160-61.] "In a word, the judicial interpretive function is to consider what was written in the context of the circumstances under which it was written, and accord to the language a rational meaning in keeping with the express general purpose." Barila, 241 N.J. at 616 (quoting Owens v. Press Publ'g Co., 20 N.J. 537, 543 (1956)). Applying these principles, we reverse because we disagree with the judge's legal determinations regarding the interpretation of the DSA as well as the application of state law to the disposition of federal savings bonds in the circumstance of this case. As to the latter, we agree with Jeanine's contention that the judge erred in applying state law to decide the bonds' disposition because state law was preempted by controlling federal law. "A savings bond is a contract between the United States and the bond owner, and Treasury regulations are incorporated into the bond contract." Laturner v. United States, 933 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In Free v. Bland, the United States Supreme Court held that "Treasury Regulations creating a right of survivorship in United States Savings Bonds pre-empt[ed] any inconsistent Texas community property law by virtue of the Supremacy 17 A-2944-21 Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution." 369 U.S. 663, 664 (1962); see Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 406 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[W]here Congress has delegated the authority to regulate a particular field to an administrative agency, the agency's regulations issued pursuant to that authority have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes." (quoting Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008))). In [Free], Treasury regulations provided that when one bond owner died, the surviving co-owner (there, the decedent's husband) became the sole owner of the bond. [369 U.S.] at 664-65. Under Texas state community property laws, however, the principal beneficiary under the decedent's will (there, the decedent's son) was entitled to a one-half interest in the bonds—despite not being a co-owner of the bond under Treasury regulations. [Ibid.] The Court held that the state law was preempted because it prevented bond owners "from taking advantage of the survivorship provisions" of the Treasury regulations. Id. at 669-70. The Court reasoned that "Federal law of course governs the interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government bonds," [Ibid.] (quoting Bank of Am. Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34 (1956)), and a state may not "fail[] to give effect to a term or condition under which a federal bond is issued," id. at 669. In other words, Treasury regulations conferred a right on bond holders which Texas state law impermissibly restricted. [Laturner, 933 F.3d at 1361 (emphasis omitted).] After concluding that the federal regulations preempted state law, the Court nevertheless noted that, unlike other regulatory survivorship provisions, 18 A-2944-21 the regulations governing savings bonds "neither insulate[d] the purchasers from all claims regarding ownership nor immunize[d] the bonds from execution in satisfaction of a judgment." Free, 369 U.S. at 670. The Court interpreted this omission as "an exception implicit in the savings bond regulations, including the survivorship provision, so that federal bonds will not be a sanctuary for a wrongdoer's gains." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that exception, the Court clarified that its ruling was premised on the fact that "no issue of fraud was or could properly have been decided by the court below" based on the record presented. Id. at 671. In Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, the United States Supreme Court extended the preemption holding in Free to bonds held in the beneficiary form. 376 U.S. 306, 307-08 (1964). In Yiatchos, the decedent, a resident of a community property state, used "community funds belonging to himself and his wife" to purchase federal savings bonds. Id. at 308. The bonds were issued in the name of the decedent as the registered owner but "were made payable on his death to his brother." Ibid. The decedent's will then "nam[ed] his wife as executrix and bequeath[ed] all cash and bonds owned by him at the time of his death to his brother, four sisters and a nephew." Ibid. The brother sued to establish his ownership of the bonds, relying upon the federal regulations providing for registration of the 19 A-2944-21 savings bonds in the beneficiary form and providing that in the case of the death of the registered owner "the beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner, and payment or reissue will be made as though the bond were registered in his name alone." [Ibid. (quoting 31 C.F.R. § 315.66).] Applying the state's community property law, the trial court ordered that the bonds "be divided into two equal parts, one-half to go to the wife and the other half to be distributed in accordance with the will." Ibid. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, reasoning that by using community funds to purchase bonds that were exclusively payable to himself or his brother, the decedent had effectively "divest[ed] the wife of any interest in her own property," which was a "constructive fraud" under state law. Ibid. The United States Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "survivorship provisions of the federal regulations must control, preempting, if necessary, inconsistent state law which interferes with the legitimate exercise of the Federal Government's power to borrow money." Id. at 311. The Court concluded that "[u]nder the federal regulations, [the brother was] entitled to the bonds unless [the decedent] committed fraud or breach of trust tantamount to fraud" in designating him as beneficiary. Id. at 309. "[T]he case was remanded to give the widow an opportunity to demonstrate that she had not consented to or ratified the purchase and registration of the bonds" and "for the determination, under 20 A-2944-21 state law, whether the widow had an interest in the community's specific assets, or only a half interest in the estate generally." Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 58 (1981) (citing Yiatchos, 376 U.S. at 309). Because federal regulations govern "the interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government bonds," Free, 369 U.S. at 669- 70 (quoting Bank of Am., 352 U.S. at 34), and preempts state law where state law "fails to give effect to a term or condition under which a federal bond is issued," id. at 669, the question presented is whether application of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 in this case conflicts with federal regulations governing bond ownership. If so, absent evidence of fraud, breach of trust, or other wrongful conversion of property, Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 58-59, "the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted," Laturner, 933 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018)). The bonds at issue in this case are Series EE bonds. The Treasury is specifically authorized by Congress to "prescribe for savings bonds . . . the conditions, including restrictions on transfer, to which they will be subject," as well as "conditions governing their redemption." 31 U.S.C. §§ 3105(c)(3)-(4). Treasury regulations governing the "terms and conditions" of Series EE savings 21 A-2944-21 bonds are set forth in Part 353 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations.6 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Savings Bond Regulations, TreasuryDirect, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/laws-and-regulations/savings-bond-regulations (last visited July 18, 2023); see also 31 C.F.R. § 353.0 (amended 2005). Pursuant to the regulations, a bond's "registration must express the actual ownership of, and interest in, the bond," and "registration is conclusive of ownership, except as provided in [§] 353.49."7 31 C.F.R. § 353.5(a); see id. § 353.7(a)(3) ("A bond may be registered in the name of one individual payable on death to another."). Furthermore, savings bonds are "not transferable and are payable only to the owners . . . except as specifically provided in [Part 353] and then only in the manner and to the extent so provided." Id. § 353.15. In order to effectuate any change in a bond's registration, including changes in ownership pursuant to recognized court orders, a Series EE bond must be reissued. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Changing information about EE or I savings bonds (reissuing), TreasuryDirect, https://treasurydirect.gov/savings-bonds/manage- 6 7 31 C.F.R. § 353.49 provides: "A bond may be reissued to correct an error in registration upon appropriate request supported by satisfactory proof of the error." Jeanine incorrectly relies on 31 C.F.R. § 360.22, which applies to Series I bonds, while the estate mistakenly cites 31 C.F.R. § 315, which applies to Series A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, and K bonds, as well as U.S. Savings Notes. Notwithstanding the error, the regulations relied on by the parties are identical to the provisions specific to Series EE bonds. 22 A-2944-21 bonds/changing-information-ee-or-i-bonds (last visited July 18, 2023); 31 C.F.R. § 353.47 (amended 2014). "Reissue of a bond may be made only under the conditions specified in [Part 353]." 31 C.F.R. § 353.45(a). Generally speaking, "[t]he Department of the Treasury will not recognize a judicial determination that gives effect to an attempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of a bond, or a judicial determination that impairs the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations upon a co[-]owner or beneficiary." Id. § 353.20(a). That said, the Treasury will recognize "a claim against an owner of a savings bond and conflicting claims of ownership of, or interest in, a bond between . . . the registered owner and the beneficiary" if the claim is "established by valid, judicial proceedings specifically listed in [31 C.F.R. §§ 353.20- 353.24]." Id. § 353.20(b). "To establish the validity of judicial proceedings, certified copies of the final judgment, decree, or court order, and of any necessary supplementary proceedings, must be submitted" with the request for reissue or payment. Id. § 353.23(a). Divorce proceedings are among those recognized by the Treasury. Id. § 353.22. In the event of a divorce, "[t]he Department of the Treasury will recognize a divorce decree that ratifies or confirms a property settlement agreement disposing of bonds or that otherwise settles the interests of the parties in a bond." Id. § 353.22(a). Pertinent to this appeal, to eliminate a beneficiary 23 A-2944-21 designation on a bond, federal regulations require the owner to surrender the bond to an authorized agent and submit a request for reissue using specified "[s]ervice forms." Id. §§ 353.51, 353.47(c)(3). The submission of certified documents to establish the divorce decree's validity is also required. Id. §§ 353.22, 353.23. Upon satisfaction of § 353.23(a), "[r]eissue of a savings bond may be made to eliminate . . . or to substitute the name of one spouse for that of the other spouse as owner, co[-]owner, or beneficiary pursuant to the decree." Id. § 353.22(a). N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 provides, in pertinent part: Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce or annulment, a divorce or annulment: (1) revokes any revocable: (a) dispositions or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his former spouse in a governing instrument ...; [N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14(a).] Thus, under state law, "divorce automatically revokes a disposition of property made by a divorced individual to his [or her] former spouse in a governing instrument." Fox v. Lincoln Fin. Grp., 439 N.J. Super. 380, 389 (App. Div. 2015) (citing N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14). The term "[g]overning instrument" includes a 24 A-2944-21 "security registered in beneficiary form with the designation 'pay on death,'" N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1, and for purposes of the revocation rule, "means a governing instrument executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or annulment," N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14(b)(2). Against this legal backdrop, Jeanine contends "the 'presumptive revocation' provision of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 did not apply to the distribution of [Michael's] bonds" because federal regulations "address[] the issue of changing the designation of a [POD] beneficiary in the event of a divorce" and "provide[] specific steps which must be taken to revoke the designation of a [POD] beneficiary, none of which were taken by [Michael] prior to his death." The estate counters that "[f]ederal law does not conflict with New Jersey law in this instance" because "federal regulations regarding savings bonds contemplate that divorced bond owners will be permitted to remove an ex-spouse as [a POD] beneficiary." According to the estate, because Michael "could have changed the [POD] designation on the savings bonds and that change would have been recognized by the Department of the Treasury," applying N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 to attain the same result is not contrary to federal law notwithstanding Michael's inaction. We are convinced that under Free and Yiatchos, the regulations governing bond registration and ownership as well as the modification requirements 25 A-2944-21 pursuant to recognized judicial proceedings conflict with the inconsistent provisions of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14, which would automatically revoke the bonds' POD designation and disposition upon divorce. As a result, the federal regulations preempt N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 under the circumstances of this case. A contrary result would fail "to give effect to a term or condition under which a federal bond is issued." Free, 369 U.S. at 669. Under 31 C.F.R. § 353.70(c)(1), a beneficiary's bond ownership is established upon proof of death of the owner. Therefore, once Michael died, in the absence of fraud or breach of trust, neither of which is alleged here,8 Jeanine became the sole and absolute owner of the bonds. See ibid. By determining that Jeanine's beneficiary designation was automatically revoked under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 by virtue of the divorce, the judge "fail[ed] to give effect" to Jeanine's federal ownership rights and "rendered the award of title meaningless." Free, 369 U.S. at 669. We reject the estate's contention that Free is not controlling because Free "did not involve a divorce decree or a divorce settlement agreement." Federal courts have consistently applied Free beyond the facts presented in that case. 8 In its brief, the estate implies wrongdoing on Jeanine's part. However, the record is inadequate to sustain such a finding on summary judgment. See Sullivan v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 449 N.J. Super. 276, 283 (App. Div. 2017) (noting that "[c]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are insufficient" on summary judgment (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005))). 26 A-2944-21 See United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1973) (applying Free in upholding assessment of estate tax after decedent attempted inter vivos transfer of bonds without removing her own name as co-owner); Laturner, 933 F.3d at 1360-61 (applying Free to reject states' claim of bond ownership based on state escheat laws); cf. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1979) (discussing Free and Yiatchos in determining the effect of divorce on allocation of federally-created retirement benefits). We also reject the estate's reliance on out-of-state cases that neither have precedential value nor compel a different result. See Meadowlands Basketball Assocs. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 340 N.J. Super. 76, 83 (App. Div. 2001) (noting that other states' "interpretive decisions are . . . not binding or controlling"). The estate principally relies on Smalley v. Smalley, 399 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. App. 2013), where, as here, the husband "did not have the Savings Bonds reissued and did not change the [POD] beneficiary designation . . . following the couple's divorce." Id. at 634. After the husband died intestate, the ex-wife "obtained possession of the Savings Bonds" and the estate filed a petition seeking to enforce the terms of the final divorce decree that "divested [the ex-wife] of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to . . . all dividends, splits, and other rights and privileges in connection [with] . . . [t]he U.S. Treasury Savings Bonds . . . in the name of either or both parties." Id. at 634-35. The Smalley court declined 27 A-2944-21 to apply Free's preemption holding because the divorce decree satisfied the relevant federal regulations and did "not conflict with enforcement of the alleged waiver" of her beneficiary rights. Id. at 640. Here, the DSA contained no provision identifying the savings bonds or divesting Jeanine's rights in them. Indeed, the DSA never even mentions the savings bonds. The estate's reliance on Meer v. Garvey, 212 So.2d 97, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) is similarly misplaced. In Meer, during the marriage, the husband purchased federal savings bonds, designating his wife as co-owner on some and beneficiary on others. Id. at 97. After they divorced, the husband retained possession of the bonds and, after his death, his estate filed suit to determine ownership of the bonds because his "will left his entire estate to his two brothers." Id. at 97-98. Like the DSA in this case, the settlement agreement between the spouses in Meer did not specifically dispose of the disputed federal savings bonds. Id. at 98. However, the release provision in Meer "released, discharged, barred, terminated and extinguished" any "manner of . . . bonds, covenants, contracts, agreements, judgments, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which each party ever had." Ibid. Moreover, unlike the DSA, the property settlement agreement in Meer did not appear to include an express reservation of certain rights. Id. at 98-99. 28 A-2944-21 The majority in Meer distinguished Free and found "[n]o . . . conflict" warranting preemption. Id. at 99. The court determined that the ownership of the bonds was vested in the estate, rather than the ex-wife, because the settlement agreement "was broad enough in scope to include and settle their respective interests in the U.S. Savings Bonds." Id. at 98-99. However, the dissenting opinion would have awarded the bonds to the ex-wife based on "[the] view . . . [that] the agreement [was not] broad enough to nullify [the ex-wife's] ownership of the bonds." Id. at 100 (Pearson, J., dissenting). Once again, here, the DSA contained no provision identifying the bonds or divesting Jeanine's rights in them. The judge's decision to credit the bond proceeds against Jeanine's DSA claims was premised on an unsubstantiated assumption that Michael intended to remove Jeanine as a beneficiary after they divorced as well as the mistaken belief that "all issues ha[d] been resolved" by the DSA. However, that belief is contrary to the plain terms of the DSA, which provided that Jeanine will not waive, release[], and relinquish[] any actual or potential right, claim, or cause of action against the other party, including but not limited to asserting a claim against the estate of the other party or to act as a personal representative of that estate, except as otherwise provided in this agreement or arising hereunder. 29 A-2944-21 To bolster the judge's mistaken belief, the estate invokes the release provision, arguing that "[Jeanine] relinquished all claims except those based on enforcement of [Michael's] obligations under the terms of the DSA." The DSA's release provision states: Each party, except as otherwise provided in this [a]greement, releases the other from all claims, liabilities, debts, obligations, actions, and causes of action of every kind, whether known or unknown. However, neither party is relieved from any obligation under this agreement, or under any document executed pursuant to this agreement, or under any judgment or order issued incident to this agreement. The release provision expressly applied to a right that had not been preserved elsewhere in the DSA. The waiver provision preserved "any actual or potential right, claim, or cause of action" Jeanine had, not just those associated with enforcement of Michael's DSA obligations. Read together, Jeanine did not waive all claims or rights she had relating to Michael. Therefore, contrary to the estate's assertion, the release provision did not conclusively divest Jeanine of all rights unrelated to enforcing her entitlement to the $200,000. Instead, given that the waiver provision preserves "any and all rights," the DSA preserved the right of survivorship the bonds conferred upon Jeanine. See Manahawkin Convalescent, 217 N.J. at 118 ("Contracts should be read 'as a whole in a fair and common sense manner.'" (quoting Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009))). 30 A-2944-21 In sum, the judge erred as a matter of law in concluding that the bonds should be credited towards the estate's DSA obligation. Under the applicable federal regulations, Jeanine became the sole owner of the bonds upon Michael's death, and she was entitled to payment as the sole owner. See 31 C.F.R. § 353.70(c)(1). In the absence of any allegation of fraud or breach of trust, application of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 in this case, which allowed the estate to improperly avoid the consequences of the bonds' beneficiary registration, conflicts with the governing federal regulations under Free and Yiatchos and is therefore preempted. Nothing in the parties' DSA warrants a contrary conclusion. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 31 A-2944-21

NJ Court Rule 4:86 Action for Guardianship of a Mentally Incapacitated Person, Alzheimer or for the Appointment of a Conservator

 (a) Every action for the determination of incapacity of a person and for the appointment of a guardian of that person or of the person’s estate or both, other than an action with respect to a veteran under N.J.S.A. 3B:13-1 et seq., or with respect to a kinship legal guardianship under N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 et seq., shall be brought pursuant to R. 4:86- 1 through R. 4:86-8 for appointment of a general, limited or pendente lite temporary guardian. (b) Judiciary records of all actions set forth in R. 4:86-1(a) shall be maintained by the Surrogate and shall be accessible pursuant to R. 1:38-3(e). (c) Each vicinage shall operate a Guardianship Monitoring Program through the collaboration of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part; the County Surrogates; and the Administrative Office of the Courts, Civil Practice Division. (1) The functions of guardianship support and monitoring shall be established by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Such functions shall include guardianship training and review of inventories and periodic reports of financial accounting filed by guardians as required by R. 4:86-6(e). (2) Post-adjudicated case issues identified through monitoring may be forwarded for further action by the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part and/or the Administrative Office of the Courts. (3) Case monitoring issues referred to the attention of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Probate Part shall be promptly reviewed, and such further action taken as deemed appropriate in the discretion of the court. (4) Quasi-judicial immunity shall be extended to Judiciary staff, County Surrogates, County Surrogate staff, and volunteers performing monitoring responsibilities in the Guardianship Monitoring Program.

(a) Complaint. The allegations of the complaint shall be verified as prescribed by R. 1:4-7. The complaint shall state: (1) the name, age, domicile and address of the plaintiff, of the alleged incapacitated person and of the alleged incapacitated person’s spouse, if any; (2) the plaintiff’s relationship to the alleged incapacitated person; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in the action; (4) the names, addresses and ages of the alleged incapacitated person’s children, if any, and the names and addresses of the alleged incapacitated person’s parents and nearest of kin, meaning at a minimum all persons of the same degree of relationship to the alleged incapacitated person as the plaintiff; (5) the name and address of the person or institution having the care and custody of the alleged incapacitated person; (6) if the alleged incapacitated person has lived in an institution, the period or periods of time the alleged incapacitated person has lived therein, the date of the commitment or confinement, and by what authority committed or confined; and (7) the name and address of any person named as attorney-in-fact in any power of attorney executed by the alleged incapacitated person, any person named as health care representative in any health care directive executed by the alleged incapacitated person, and any person acting as trustee under a trust for the benefit of the alleged incapacitated person. (b) Accompanying Documents. The complaint shall have annexed thereto: (1) An affidavit or certification stating the nature, description, and fair market value of the following, in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts: (A) all real estate in which the alleged incapacitated person has or may have a present or future interest, stating the interest, describing the real estate fully and stating the assessed valuation thereof; (B) all the personal estate which he or she is, will or may in all probability become entitled to, including stocks, bonds, mutual funds, securities and investment accounts; money on hand, annuities, checking and savings accounts and certificates of deposit in banks and notes or other indebtedness due the alleged incapacitated person; pensions and retirement accounts, including annuities and profit sharing plans; miscellaneous personal property; and the nature and total monthly amount of any income which may be payable to the alleged incapacitated person; and (C) the encumbrance amount of any debt including any secured associated debt related to the real estate or personal estate of the alleged incapacitated person. (2) Affidavits or certifications of two physicians having qualifications set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2t, or the affidavit or certification of one such physician and one licensed practicing psychologist as defined in N.J.S.A. 45:14B-2, in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:12- 24.1(d), the affidavits or certifications may make disclosures about the alleged incapacitated person. If an alleged incapacitated person has been committed to a public institution and is confined therein, one of the affidavits or certifications shall be that of the chief executive officer, the medical director, or the chief of service providing that person is also the physician with overall responsibility for the professional program of care and treatment in the administrative unit of the institution. However, where an alleged incapacitated person is domiciled within this State but resident elsewhere, the affidavits or certifications required by this rule may be those of persons who are residents of the state or jurisdiction of the alleged incapacitated person’s residence. Each affiant shall have made a personal examination of the alleged incapacitated person not more than 30 days prior to the filing of the complaint, but said time period may be relaxed by the court on an ex parte showing of good cause. To support the complaint, each affiant shall state: (A) the date and place of the examination; (B) whether the affiant has treated or merely examined the alleged incapacitated individual; (C) whether the affiant is disqualified under R. 4:86-3; (D) the diagnosis and prognosis and factual basis therefor; (E) for purposes of ensuring that the alleged incapacitated person is the same individual who was examined, a physical description of the person examined, including but not limited to sex, age and weight; (F) the affiant’s opinion of the extent to which the alleged incapacitated person is unfit and unable to govern himself or herself and to manage his or her affairs and shall set forth with particularity the circumstances and conduct of the alleged incapacitated person upon which this opinion is based, including a history of the alleged incapacitated person’s condition; (G) if applicable, the extent to which the alleged incapacitated person retains sufficient capacity to retain the right to manage specific areas, such as residential, educational, medical, legal, vocational or financial decisions; and (H) an opinion on whether the alleged incapacitated person is capable of attending or otherwise participating in the hearing and, if not, the reasons for the individual’s inability; (3) An affidavit or certification setting forth the criminal and civil judgment history of each proposed guardian, in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. The affidavit or certification may be supplemented at any time up to the time of qualification and acceptance of appointment. If no proposed guardian has been identified at the time of the filing of the complaint, the affidavit or certification shall be filed no later than prior to the entry of the judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian. The court will consider the relevant history as provided in the affidavit or certification and through any background screening policy for proposed guardians of incapacitated adults promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts, including but not limited to fingerprinting. The following shall be exempt from this requirement: (A) individuals who are the parents in a parent and child relationship with an alleged incapacitated person, as ‘parent and child relationship‘ is defined by the New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-39, or who were appointed legal guardians of an alleged incapacitated person prior to their reaching majority pursuant to an order of the Family Division of Superior Court; (B) individuals who are married to an alleged incapacitated person in accordance with N.J.S.A. 37:1-29 et seq., in a civil union with an alleged incapacitated person as defined by N.J.S.A. 37:1-29, or in a domestic partnership with an alleged incapacitated person as defined by N.J.S.A. 26:8A-3; (C) pendente lite temporary guardians appointed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24.1(c); (D) agencies authorized to act pursuant to P.L.1985, c. 298 (N.J.S.A. 52:27G-20 et seq.), P.L.1985, c. 145 (N.J.S.A. 30:6D-23 et seq.), P.L.1965, c. 59 (N.J.S.A. 30:4-165.1 et seq.) and P.L.1970, c. 289 (N.J.S.A. 30:4-165.7 et seq.); (E) public officials appointed as limited guardians of the person for medical purposes for individuals in psychiatric facilities listed in N.J.S.A. 30: 1-7; (F) banks, trust companies, credit unions, savings and loan associations, or other financial institutions duly licensed or authorized to conduct business under applicable state or federal laws; and(G) attorneys admitted to practice law and in good standing in the State of New Jersey who are appointed by the court in their professional capacity; and (H) notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) through (G), (i) Any proposed guardian who is exempt from background screening pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) shall file an affidavit or certification setting forth the proposed guardian’s criminal and civil judgment history for the prior 10 years; and (ii) The court may require any proposed guardian to file an affidavit or certification setting forth the proposed guardian’s criminal and civil judgment history or to undergo background screening as a prerequisite to appointment based on the individual facts of the case, including but not limited to the value of the guardianship estate; and (4) A Case Information Statement in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Said Case Information Statement shall include the date of birth and Social Security number of the alleged incapacitated person. (c) Alternative Affidavits or Certifications. (1) If the plaintiff cannot secure the information required in paragraph (b)(1), the complaint shall so state and give the reasons therefor, and the affidavit or certification submitted shall in that case contain as much information as can be secured in the exercise of reasonable diligence. (2) In lieu of the affidavits or certifications provided for in paragraph (b)(2), an affidavit or certification of one affiant having the qualifications as required therein shall be submitted, stating that he or she has endeavored to make a personal examination of the alleged incapacitated person not more than 30 days prior to the filing of the complaint but that the alleged incapacitated person or those in charge of him or her have refused or are unwilling to have the affiant make such an examination. The time period herein prescribed may be relaxed by the court on an ex parte showing of good cause.

No affidavit or certification shall be submitted by a physician or psychologist who is related, either through blood or marriage, to the alleged incapacitated person or to a proprietor, director or chief executive officer of any institution (except state, county or federal institutions) for the care and treatment of the ill in which the alleged incapacitated person is living, or in which it is proposed to place him or her, or who is professionally employed by the management thereof as a resident physician or psychologist, or who is financially interested therein. 

(a) Review of Complaint Prior to Docketing. Prior to docketing, the Surrogate shall review the complaint to ensure that proper venue is laid and that it contains all information required by R. 4:86-2. (b) Docketing. (1) Upon the filing of a complaint for the determination of incapacity of a person and for the appointment of a guardian, if it appears that there is jurisdiction and that the complaint is substantially complete in all respects, the complaint shall be docketed. (2) If, after docketing, there is a lack of jurisdiction, the court shall dismiss the complaint forthwith. If a complaint is not substantially complete in all respects, the Surrogate shall process the complaint in accordance with R. 1:5-6. (c) Availability of Guardianship File. The Surrogate shall make the complete guardianship file available to the court upon request.

(a) Contents of Order. (1) If the court is satisfied with the sufficiency of the complaint and supporting affidavits and that further proceedings should be taken thereon, it shall enter an order fixing a date for hearing. (2) The order shall require that at least 20 days’ notice thereof be given to the alleged incapacitated person, any person named as attorney-in-fact in any power of attorney executed by the alleged incapacitated person, any person named as health care representative in any health care directive executed by the alleged incapacitated person, and any person acting as trustee under a trust for the benefit of the alleged incapacitated person, the alleged incapacitated person’s spouse, children 18 years of age or over, parents, the person having custody of the alleged incapacitated person, the attorney appointed pursuant to R. 4:86-4(b), and such other persons as the court directs. Notice shall be effected by service of a copy of the order, complaint and supporting affidavits upon the alleged incapacitated person personally and upon each of the other persons in such manner as the court directs. (3) The order for hearing shall expressly provide that appointed counsel for the alleged incapacitated person is authorized to seek and obtain medical and psychiatric information from all health care providers. (4) The court may allow shorter notice or waive notice upon a showing of good cause. In such case, the order shall recite the basis for shortening or waiving notice, and proof shall be submitted at the hearing that such basis continues to exist. (5) A separate notice shall be personally served on the alleged incapacitated person stating that if he or she desires to oppose the action, he or she may appear either in person or by attorney, and may demand a trial by jury. (6) The order for hearing shall require that any proposed guardian complete guardianship training as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts; however, agencies authorized to act pursuant to P.L.1985, c. 298 (C.52:27G-20 et seq.), P.L.1985, c. 145 (C.30:6D-23 et seq.), P.L.1965, c. 59 (C.30:4-165.1 et seq.) and P.L.1970, c. 289 (C.30:4-165.7 et seq.) and public officials appointed as limited guardians of the person for medical purposes for individuals in psychiatric facilities listed in R.S.30:1-7 shall be exempt from this requirement. (7) The order for hearing shall require that any proposed guardian comply with any applicable background screening policy for proposed guardians of incapacitated adults as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts, including but not limited to fingerprinting. A copy of the policy shall be provided with the order for hearing. (8) If the alleged incapacitated person is not represented by counsel, the order shall include the appointment by the court of counsel for the alleged incapacitated person. (b) Duties of Counsel. (1) Counsel shall (i) personally interview the alleged incapacitated person; (ii) make inquiry of persons having knowledge of the alleged incapacitated person’s circumstances, his or her physical and mental state and his or her property; (iii) make reasonable inquiry to locate any will, powers of attorney, or health care directives previously executed by the alleged incapacitated person or to discover any interests the alleged incapacitated person may have as beneficiary of a will or trust. (2) At least ten days prior to the hearing date, counsel shall file a report with the court and serve a copy thereof on plaintiff’s attorney and other parties who have formally appeared in the matter. The report shall be in such form and include all such provisions as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts, except to the extent that the court explicitly directs otherwise. The report shall include the following: (i) the information developed by counsel’s inquiry; (ii) recommendations concerning the court’s determination on the issue of incapacity; (iii) any recommendations concerning the suitability of less restrictive alternatives such as a conservatorship or a delineation of those areas of decision making that the alleged incapacitated person may be capable of exercising; (iv) whether a case plan for the incapacitated person should thereafter be submitted to the court; (v) whether the alleged incapacitated person has expressed dispositional preferences and, if so, counsel shall argue for their inclusion in the judgment of the court; and (vi) recommendations concerning whether good cause exists for the court to order that any power of attorney, health care directive, or revocable trust created by the alleged incapacitated person be revoked or the authority of the person or persons acting thereunder be modified or restricted. (3) If the alleged incapacitated person obtains other counsel, such counsel shall notify the court and appointed counsel at least ten days prior to the hearing date. (c) Examination. If the affidavit or certification supporting the complaint is made pursuant to R. 4:86-2(c), the court may, on motion and upon notice to all persons entitled to notice of the hearing under paragraph (a), order the alleged incapacitated person to submit to an examination. The motion shall set forth the names and addresses of the physicians who will conduct the examination, and the order shall specify the time, place and conditions of the examination. Upon request, the report thereof shall be furnished to either the examined party or his or her attorney. (d) Guardian Ad Litem. At any time prior to entry of judgment, where special circumstances come to the attention of the court by formal motion or otherwise, a guardian ad litem may, in addition to counsel, be appointed to evaluate the best interests of the alleged incapacitated person and to present that evaluation to the court. (e) Compensation. The compensation of the attorney for the party seeking guardianship, appointed counsel, and of the guardian ad litem, if any, may be fixed by the court to be paid out of the estate of the alleged incapacitated person or in such other manner as the court shall direct.

(a) Not later than ten days prior to the hearing, the plaintiff shall file proof of service of the notice, order for hearing, complaint and affidavits or certifications and proof by affidavit that the alleged incapacitated person has been afforded the opportunity to appear personally or by attorney, and that he or she has been given or offered assistance to communicate with friends, relatives or attorneys. (b) Prior to the hearing, unless good cause shown, but no later than prior to qualification, any proposed guardian must complete guardianship training as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. Agencies authorized to act pursuant to P.L.1985, c. 298 (C.52:27G-20 et seq.), P.L.1985, c. 145 (C.30:6D-23 et seq.), P.L.1965, c. 59 (C.30:4-165.1 et seq.) and P.L.1970, c. 289 (C.30:4-165.7 et seq.) and public officials appointed as limited guardians of the person for medical purposes for individuals in psychiatric facilities listed in R.S. 30:1-7 shall be exempt from this requirement. (c) The plaintiff or appointed counsel shall produce the alleged incapacitated person at the hearing, unless the plaintiff and the court-appointed attorney certify that the alleged incapacitated person is unable to appear because of physical or mental incapacity. (d) If the alleged incapacitated person or any person receiving notice of the hearing intends to appear by an attorney, such person shall, not later than ten days before the hearing, serve and file an answer, affidavit, or motion in response to the complaint.

(a) Trial. Unless a trial by jury is demanded by or on behalf of the alleged incapacitated person, or is ordered by the court, the court shall, after taking testimony in open court, determine the issue of incapacity. The court, with the consent of counsel for the alleged incapacitated person, may take the testimony of a person who has filed an affidavit or certification pursuant to R. 4:86-2(b) by telephone or may dispense with oral testimony and rely on the affidavits or certifications submitted. Telephone testimony shall be recorded verbatim. (b) Motion for New Trial. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 30 days after the entry of the judgment. (c) Appointment of General or Limited Guardian. If a general or limited guardian of the person or of the estate or of both the person and estate is to be appointed, the court shall appoint and letters shall be granted to any of the following. (1) the incapacitated person’s spouse, if the spouse was living with the incapacitated person as husband or wife at the time the incapacity arose; (2) the incapacitated person’s next of kin; or (3) the Office of the Public Guardian for Elderly Adults within the statutory mandate of that office. If none of them will accept the appointment, or if the court is satisfied that no appointment from among them will be in the best interests of the incapacitated person or estate, then the court shall appoint and letters shall be granted to such other person who will accept appointment as the court determines is in the best interests of the incapacitated person. Such persons may include registered professional guardians or surrogate decision-makers chosen by the incapacitated person before incapacity by way of a durable power of attorney, health care proxy, or advance directive. (d) Judgment. (1) The judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian shall be in such form and include all such provisions as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts, except to the extent that the court explicitly directs otherwise. (2) Unless expressly waived therein, the judgment appointing the guardian shall fix the amount of the bond. If there are extraordinary reasons justifying the waiver of a bond, that determination shall be set forth in a decision supported by appropriate factual findings. (3) A proposed judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian shall be filed with the Surrogate not later than ten days prior to the hearing. (e) Duties of Guardian. (1) Not later than 30 days after entry of the judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian, the guardian shall qualify and accept the appointment in accordance with R. 4:96-1. The acceptance of appointment shall include an acknowledgment that the guardian has completed guardianship training as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts in accordance with R. 4:86-5(b). The acceptance of appointment shall also include an acknowledgment of compliance with any background screening policy for proposed guardians of incapacitated adults promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts, including but not limited to fingerprinting and disclosure of any changes to the guardian’s criminal or civil judgment history through any required periodic reporting. (2) Unless expressly waived in the judgment, the guardian of the estate shall file with the Surrogate, and serve on all interested parties, within 90 days of appointment an inventory in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts specifying all property and income of the incapacitated person’s estate. (3) Unless expressly waived in the judgment, the guardian of the estate shall file with the Surrogate reports of the financial accounting of the incapacitated person as required by N.J.S.A. 3B:12-42 and in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. The report shall be filed annually unless otherwise specified in the judgment. (4) Unless expressly waived in the judgment, the guardian of the person shall file with the Surrogate reports of the well-being of the incapacitated person as required by N.J.S.A. 3B:12-42 and in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. The report shall be filed annually unless otherwise specified in the judgment. (5) The judgment shall also require the guardian to keep the Surrogate reasonably advised of the whereabouts and telephone number of the guardian and of the incapacitated person, and to advise the Surrogate within 30 days of the incapacitated person's death or of any major change in his or her status or health. As to the incapacitated person’s death, the guardian shall provide written notification to the Surrogate and shall provide the Surrogate with a copy of the death certificate within seven days of the guardian’s receipt of the death certificate. (6) A guardian shall cooperate fully with any Court or Surrogate staff or volunteers until the guardianship is terminated by the death or return to capacity of the incapacitated person, or the guardian’s death, removal or discharge. (7) The guardian shall monitor the capacity of the incapacitated person over time and take such steps as are necessary to protect the interests of the incapacitated person, including but not limited to initiating an action for return to capacity as provided in N.J.S.A. 3B:12-28. (f) Duties of Surrogate. (1) The Surrogate shall provide the entire complete guardianship file to the court for review no later than seven days before the hearing. (2) At the time of qualification and issuance of letters of guardianship, the Surrogate shall review the acceptance of appointment and letters of guardianship with the guardian in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts. (3) The Surrogate shall issue letters of guardianship following the guardian’s qualification. The Surrogate shall record issuance of all letters of guardianship. Letters of guardianship shall accurately reflect the provisions of the judgment. (4) The Surrogate shall record receipt of all inventories, reports of financial accounting, and reports of well-being filed pursuant to paragraphs (e)(3) through (e)(5) above. (5) The Surrogate shall notify the court, and shall issue notices to the guardian in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts, in the event that: (A) the guardian fails to qualify and accept the appointment within 30 days after entry of the judgment of legal incapacity and appointment of guardian in accordance with paragraph (e)(1) above; or (B) the guardian fails to timely file inventories, reports of financial accounting, and/or reports of well-being filed in accordance with paragraphs (e)(3) through (e)(5) above. (6) The Surrogate shall immediately notify the court if they are informed through oral or written communication, or become aware by other means, of emergent allegations of substantial harm to the physical or mental health, safety and well-being, and/or the property or business affairs, of an alleged or adjudicated incapacitated person. However, the Surrogate shall have no obligation to review inventories, periodic reports of well-being, informal accountings, or other documents filed by guardians, except for formal accountings subject to audit by the Surrogate. (7) The Surrogate shall record the death of the incapacitated person.

(a) Rights of an Incapacitated Person. An individual subject to a general or limited guardianship shall retain: (1) The right to be treated with dignity and respect; (2) The right to privacy; (3) The right to equal treatment under the law; (4) The right to have personal information kept confidential; (5) The right to communicate privately with an attorney or other advocate; (6) The right to petition the court to modify or terminate the guardianship, including the right to meet privately with an attorney or other advocate to assist with this legal procedure, as well as the right to petition for access to funds to cover legal fees and costs; and (7) The right to request the court to review the guardian’s actions, request removal and replacement of the guardian, and/or request that the court restore rights as provided in N.J.S.A. 3B:12-28. (b) Proceedings for Return to Capacity. (1) An incapacitated person, an interested person on the behalf, or the guardian may seek a return to full or partial capacity by commencing a separate summary action by verified complaint. The complaint shall be supported by at least one affidavit or certification as described in Rule 4:86-2(b)(2), and shall set forth facts evidencing that the previously incapacitated person no longer is incapacitated or has returned to partial capacity. The court in its discretion may require additional proofs as needed. (2) The court shall, on notice to the persons who would be set forth in a complaint filed pursuant to Rule 4:86-2, set a date for hearing, appoint counsel for the incapacitated person if the incapacitated person is not represented, and take oral testimony in open court with or without a jury. In addition, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to evaluate the best interests of the incapacitated person and to present that evaluation to the court in accordance with Rule 4:86-4(d). (3) On presentation of prima facie evidence for termination or modification of the guardianship, the court may order termination or modification pursuant to subparagraph (4) if no party or interested person objects. Any party or interested person objecting to the termination or modification must provide clear and convincing evidence that a basis for continuation of the guardianship exists. (4) The court may render judgment that the person no longer is fully or partially incapacitated, that his or her guardianship be modified or discharged subject to the duty to account, and that his or her person and estate be restored to his or her control, or may render judgment that the guardianship be modified but not terminated. (c) Proceedings for Review ofGuardianship. An incapacitated person, or an interested person on the incapacitated person's behalf, may seek review of a guardian's conduct and/or review of a guardianship by filing a motion setting forth the basis for the relief requested. On the return date, the court shall inform the incapacitated person of their rights as set forth in paragraph (a) and of the procedures for return to capacity as set forth in paragraph (b). 

As to a person alleged or adjudicated to be incapacitated as defined in N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2 and who has reached the age of 23, an application for conversion of a child support obligation to another form of financial maintenance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 et seq. may be made as follows: (a) Prior to Adjudication of Incapacity. A plaintiff filing a complaint for adjudication of incapacity and appointment of guardian pursuant to R. 4:86-2 may request such conversion in a separate count of the complaint. (b) After Adjudication of Incapacity. A guardian or custodial parent of an adjudicated incapacitated person may request such conversion by filing a motion on notice to the parent responsible for paying child support and any interested parties setting forth the basis for the relief requested pursuant to R. 4:86-7. (c) Required Materials for Submission. Any action brought pursuant to either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) shall set forth the exceptional circumstances pursuant to which such conversion to another form of financial maintenance is requested and shall have the following annexed thereto: (1) Copies of any prior Chancery Division, Family Part orders related to the child support obligation; and (2) A financial maintenance statement in such form as promulgated by the Administrative Director of the Courts.

An action for the appointment of a guardian for a nonresident who has been or shall be found to be an incapacitated person under the laws of the state or jurisdiction in which the incapacitated person resides shall be brought in the Superior Court pursuant to R. 4:67. The plaintiff shall exhibit and file with the court an exemplified copy of the proceedings or other evidence establishing the finding. If the plaintiff is the duly appointed guardian, trustee or committee of the incapacitated person in the state or jurisdiction in which the finding was made, and applies to be appointed guardian in this State, the court may forthwith appoint that person without issuing an order to show cause.

(a) Complaint for Appointment. An action for the appointment of a guardian under N.J.S.A. 3B:13-1 et seq. for an alleged incapacitated person shall be brought in the Superior Court by any person entitled to priority of appointment. If there is no person so entitled or if the person so entitled fails or refuses to commence the action within 30 days after the mailing of notice by a federal agency to the last known address of such person entitled to priority of appointment, indicating the necessity for the appointment, the action may be brought by any person residing in this State, acting on the alleged incapacitated person’s behalf. (b) Complaint. The complaint shall state (1) the name, age and place of residence of the alleged incapacitated person; (2) the name and place of residence of the nearest relative, if known; (3) the name and address of the person or institution, if any, having custody of the alleged incapacitated person; (4) that such alleged incapacitated person is entitled to receive money payable by or through a federal agency; (5) the amount of money due and the amount of probable future payments; and (6) that the alleged incapacitated person has been rated an incapacitated person on examination by a federal agency in accordance with the laws regulating the same. (c) Proof of Necessity for Guardian of Incapacitated Person. A certificate by the chief officer, or his or her representative, stating the fact that the alleged incapacitated person has been rated an incapacitated person by a federal agency on examination in accordance with the laws and regulations governing such agency and that appointment is a condition precedent to the payment of money due the alleged incapacitated person by such agency shall be prima facie evidence of the necessity for making an appointment under this rule. (d) Determination of Incapacity. Incapacity may be determined on the certificates, without other evidence, of two medical officers of the military service, or of a federal agency, certifying that by reason of incapacity the alleged incapacitated person is incapable of managing his or her property, or certifying to such other facts as shall satisfy the court as to such incapacity (e) Appointment of Guardian; Bond. Upon proof of notice duly given and a determination of incapacity, the court may appoint a proper person to be the guardian and fix the amount of the bond. The bond shall be in an amount not less than that which will be due or become payable to the incapacitated person in the ensuing year. The court may from time to time require additional security. Before letters of guardianship shall issue, the guardian shall accept the appointment in accordance with R. 4:96-1. (f) Termination of Guardianship When Incapacitated Person Regains Capacity. If the court has appointed a guardian for the estate of an incapacitated person, it may subsequently, on due notice, declare the incapacitated person to have regained capacity on proof of a finding and determination to that effect by the medical authorities of the military service or federal agency or based on such other facts as shall satisfy the court as to the capacity of the incapacitated person. The court may thereupon discharge the guardian without further proceedings, subject to the settlement of his or her account. (g) Complaint in Action to Have Guardian Receive Additional Personality. The complaint in an action to authorize the guardian, pursuant to law, to receive personal property from any source other than the United States Government shall set forth the amount of such property and the name and address of the person or institution having actual custody of the incapacitated person. (h) Definitions. Definitions contained in N.J.S. 3B:13-2 shall apply to the terms of this rule.

An action pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-165.7 et seq. for the appointment of a guardian for a person over the age of 18 who is eligible for and/or receiving services from the Division of Developmental Disabilities shall be brought pursuant to these rules insofar as applicable, except that: (a) The complaint may be brought by the Commissioner of Human Services or a parent, spouse, relative or other party interested in the welfare of such person. (b) In lieu of the affidavits or certifications prescribed by R. 4:86-2, the verified complaint shall have annexed thereto two documents. One document shall be an affidavit or certification submitted by a practicing physician or a psychologist licensed pursuant to P.L. 1966, c.282 (N.J.S.A. 45:14B-1 et seq.) who has made a personal examination of the alleged incapacitated person not more than six months prior to the filing of the verified complaint. The other document shall be one of the following: (1) an affidavit or certification from the chief executive officer, medical director or other officer having administrative control over a Division of Developmental Disabilities program from which the individual is receiving functional or other services; (2) an affidavit or certification from a designee of the Division of Developmental Disabilities having personal knowledge of the functional capacity of the individual who is the subject of the guardianship action; (3) a second affidavit or certification from a practicing physician or psychologist licensed pursuant to P.L. 1966, c.282 (N.J.S.A. 45:14B-1 et seq.); (4) a copy of the Individualized Education Program, including any medical or other reports, for the individual who is subject to the guardianship action, which shall have been prepared no more than two years prior to the filing of the verified complaint; or (5) an affidavit or certification from a licensed care professional having personal knowledge of the functional capacity of the individual who is the subject of the guardianship action. The documents shall set forth with particularity the facts supporting the belief that the alleged incapacitated person suffers from a significant chronic functional impairment to such a degree that the person lacks the cognitive capacity either to make decisions or to communicate, in any way, decisions to others. (c) If the petition seeks guardianship of the person only, the Division of Mental Health Advocacy, in the Office of the Public Defender, if available, shall be appointed as attorney for the alleged incapacitated person, as required by R. 4:86-4. If the Division of Mental Health Advocacy, in the Office of the Public Defender, is unavailable or if the petition seeks guardianship of the person and the estate, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the alleged incapacitated person. The attorney for the alleged incapacitated person may where appropriate retain an independent expert to render an opinion respecting the incapacity of the alleged incapacitated person. (d) The hearing shall be held pursuant to R. 4:86-6 except that a guardian may be summarily appointed if the attorney for the alleged incapacitated person, by affidavit or certification, does not dispute either the need for the guardianship or the fitness of the proposed guardian and if a plenary hearing is not requested either by the alleged incapacitated person or on his or her behalf.

(a) Commencement of Action; Complaint. An action pursuant to N.J.S.A.3B:13A-1, et seq. for the appointment of a conservator shall be brought by a conservatee or other person on his or her behalf on notice, as provided by N.J.S.A. 3B:13A-5 and 6. The complaint shall be filed in the Superior Court and shall state (1) the conservatee's age and residence, (2) the names and addresses of the conservatee's heirs and all other persons entitled to notice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:13A-6 and (3) the nature, location and fair market value of all property, real and personal, in accordance with R. 4:86-2(a). (b) Hearing. The court, without a jury, shall take testimony in open court to determine whether the conservatee, by reason of advanced age, illness or physical infirmity, is unable to care for or manage his or her property or has become unable to provide for himself or herself or others dependent upon him or her for support. The court may appoint counsel for the conservatee if it concludes that counsel is necessary to protect his or her interests. If the conservatee is unable to attend the hearing by reason of physical or other disability, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to conduct an investigation to determine whether the conservatee objects to the conservatorship. If counsel for the conservatee has, however, been appointed, such counsel shall conduct the investigation and no separate guardian ad litem shall be appointed. In no case shall a conservator be appointed if the court finds that the conservatee objects thereto. (c) Acceptance of Appointment. An acceptance of appointment as conservator may be taken before any person authorized by the laws of this State to administer an oath. (d) Settlement of Conservator's Account. Where the court, for good cause shown, orders a full accounting by the conservator, the account shall be settled in the Superior Court in accordance with R. 4:87, insofar as applicable.

(a) Standards. On the application of a hospital, nursing home, treating physician, relative or other appropriate person under the circumstances, the court may appoint a special guardian of the person of a patient to act for the patient respecting medical treatment consistent with the court's order, if it finds that: (1) the patient is incapacitated, unconscious, underage or otherwise unable to consent to medical treatment; (2) no general or natural guardian is immediately available who will consent to the rendering of medical treatment; (3) the prompt rendering of medical treatment is necessary in order to deal with a substantial threat to the patient's life or health; and (4) the patient has not designated a health care representative or executed a health care instruction directive pursuant to the New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act, N.J.S.A. 26:2H-53 to -78, determining the treatment question in issue. (b) Venue. The application shall be made to the Superior Court judge assigned to general equity in the vicinage in which the patient is physically located when the application is made and, in the event of that judge's unavailability, to the Assignment Judge of the vicinage or the judge designated as the emergent judge, or if neither is available, any judge in the vicinage. (c) Procedure. The procedure on the application shall conform as nearly as practicable to the requirements of R. 4:86-1 to R. 4:86-6, but the judge may, if the circumstances require, accept an oral complaint and oral testimony either by telephone, in court, or at any other suitable location. If the circumstances do not permit the making of a verbatim record, the judge shall make detailed notes of the allegations of the complaint and the supporting testimony. Whenever possible an attorney shall be appointed to represent the patient. (d) Order. The order granting the application, if orally rendered, shall be reduced to writing as promptly as possible and shall recite the findings on which it is based.

 

Annual Update Wills and Estate Planning Free Workshop & Seminar in person in Edison Law Office and Facebook Live on July 17, 2024

Annual Update Wills and Estate Planning Free Workshop & Seminar in person in Edison Law Office and Facebook Live on July 17, 2024 from 12:15-1:00 pm Live in office FB https://www.facebook.com/events/3633726600177984/ Program also can be watched on your computer or IPhone via Facebook live Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen, 2053 Woodbridge Ave, Edison, NJ 08817 The “In office” program is limited to 9 people. Please bring a canned food donation. COST: Free for in person if you pre-register by email. Complimentary materials provided at 12:00 sharp. Please bring a canned food donation, which will be given to the St. Matthews’s St. Vincent DePaul Food Bank. Main Topics: 1. Administering the Estate/Probate /Surrogate 2. Dangers If You Have No Will or documents invalid 3. Getting your Estate Planning Documents done when you can’t go into a law office 4. What goes into a Will 5. Power of Attorneys recommendations 6. Living Will & Advance Directive for Medical Care 7. Avoiding unnecessary expenses and saving your family money s Please email us if you plan on attending or if you would like us to email the materials. SPEAKER: Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. (Author- ABA Wills and Estate Administration) COMPLIMENTARY MATERIAL: Brochures on Wills, Probate and Administration of an Estate, Power of Attorney, Living Wills, Elder Law, and Trusts. Fb __ Co-Sponsor: Middlesex County Estate Planning Council To attend in person email VercammenLaw@Njlaws.com Other Information call 732-572-0500 Can’t attend? We can email you materials Send email to VercammenLaw@Njlaws.com Free Will Seminars and Speakers Bureau for Groups SPEAKERS BUREAU At the request of senior citizen groups, unions, and Middlesex County companies and organizations, the " Speakers Bureau " is a service designed to educate citizens about how laws affect their lives and how the judicial system operates. We have attorneys available to speak to businesspersons, educational, civic and social organizations on a wide range of topics during business hours. If your organization in Central NJ would like to schedule a Will & Estates seminar, call Kenneth Vercammen’s Law Office at 732-572-0500 or email Vercammenlaw@njlaws.com 10 years ago the AARP Network Attorneys of the Edison/Metuchen/Woodbridge area several years ago established a community Speakers Bureau to provide educational programs to AARP and senior clubs, Unions and Middlesex County companies. Now, Ken Vercammen, Esq. and volunteer attorneys of the Middlesex County Estate Planning Council have provided Legal Rights Seminars to hundreds of seniors, business owners and their employees, unions, clubs and non-profit groups Details on free programs available These quality daytime educational programs will educate and even entertain. Clubs and companies are invited to schedule a free seminar. The following Seminars are now available: 1. WILLS & ESTATE ADMINISTRATION-PROTECT YOUR FAMILY AND MAKE PLANNING EASY 2. POWER OF ATTORNEY to permit family to pay your bills if you are temporarily disabled and permit doctors to talk with family All instructors are licensed attorneys who have been in practice at least 25 years. All instructors are members of the American Bar Association, New Jersey State Bar Association, and Middlesex County Bar Association. All programs include free written materials. You don't have to be wealthy or near death to do some thinking about a Will. Here is your opportunity to listen to an experienced attorney who will discuss how to distribute your property as you wish and avoid many rigid provisions of state law. Topics discussed include: Who needs a Will?; What if you die without a Will (intestacy)?; Mechanics of a Will; "Living Will"; Powers of Attorney; Selecting an executor, trustee, and guardian; Proper Will execution; Inheritance Taxes, Estate Taxes $14,000 annual gift tax exclusion, Bequests to charity, Why you need a "Self-Proving" Will and Estate Administration/ Probate. Sample materials: Hand-outs on Wills, Living Wills/Medical Advance Directive, Power of Attorney, Probate and Administration of an Estate, Real Estate, Working with your Attorney, Consumers Guide to New Jersey Laws, and Senior Citizen Rights. SPEAKERS BUREAU At the request of senior citizen groups, unions, and Middlesex County companies and organizations, the " Speakers Bureau " is a service designed to educate citizens about how laws affect their lives and how the judicial system operates. We have attorneys available to speak to businesspersons, educational, civic and social organizations on a wide range of topics during business hours. In today's complex world, few people can function successfully and safely without competent legal advice. In order to insure your estate plans are legally set up, you need to know exactly where you stand so that you can avoid possibly catastrophic mistakes impacting both you and your family. About the speaker: Kenneth A. Vercammen is a trial attorney in Edison, NJ. We is the author of the American Bar Association’s book “Wills and Estate Administration” He is co-chair of the ABA Probate & Estate Planning Law Committee of the American Bar Association Solo Small Firm Division. He is a speaker for the NJ State Bar Association at the annual Nuts & Bolts of Elder Law & Estate Administration program. He was Editor of the ABA Estate Planning Probate Committee Newsletter. Mr. Vercammen has published over 150 legal articles in national and New Jersey publications on litigation, elder law, probate and trial topics. He is a highly regarded lecturer on litigation and probate law for the American Bar Association, NJ ICLE, New Jersey State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published in noted publications included New Jersey Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, and New Jersey Lawyer. He established the NJlaws website www.njlaws.com which includes many articles on Estate Planning, Probate and Wills. He is a member of the AARP and often lectures to groups on the importance of an up to date Will, Power of Attorney and Living Will. KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030 www.njlaws.com Kenneth Vercammen is author of the ABA’s new book “Wills and Estate Administration” Straightforward and to-the-point, Wills and Estate Administration provides step-by-step guidance that firms can use to handle all aspects of an estates practice, from initial client intake to closing the file. Topics are defined in six parts for ease of use: Preparation for Wills/Estate Planning Interviews Interviewing Clients Additional Estate Planning Issues Estate Administration Guardianship of Disabled or Incompetent Parents Marketing Your Wills and Estate Administration Practice Making this an essential resource for solo and small firm practitioners, the author includes numerous forms for each topic, and they are also available for download online. The book is basic and written to help new and transitional attorneys. In addition, tips on practice management will help seasoned attorneys. Author: Kenneth A Vercammen Edison, NJ Sponsor: Solo, Small Firm and General Practice Division Publisher: ABA Book Publishing List Price: $79.95 ABA Price: $69.95 ISBN: 978-1-63425-380-2 Product Code: 5150484 2015, 290 pages, 7 x 10, Paperback http://shop.americanbar.org/eBus/Store/ProductDetails.aspx?productId=224827061 ABA Service Hotline 800-285-2221 312-988-5000 Sample chapter available http://shop.americanbar.org