Kenneth Vercammen, Esq is Chair of the ABA Elder Law Committee and presents seminars to attorneys and the public on Wills, Probate and other legal topics related to Estate Planning and Elder law. He is author of the ABA's book "Wills and Estate Administration. Kenneth Vercammen & Associates,
2053 Woodbridge Avenue - Edison, NJ 08817
(732) 572-0500 More information at www.njlaws.com/

Wednesday, October 07, 2015

Undue Influence to challenge a Will or Power of Attorney

        Undue Influence to challenge a Will or Power of Attorney                                                   
  A grievance based upon undue influence may be sustained by showing that the beneficiary had a confidential relationship with the party who established the account. Accordingly, if the challenger can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the survivor had a confidential relationship with the donor who established the account, there is a presumption of undue influence, which the surviving donee must rebut by clear and convincing evidence.

[Estate of Ostlund v. Ostlund391 N.J. Super. 390, 401 (App. Div. 2007).]

Although perhaps difficult to define, the concept "encompasses all relationships 'whether legal, natural or conventional in their origin, in which confidence is naturally inspired, or, in fact, reasonably exists.’” Pascale v. Pascale113 N.J. 20, 34 (1988) (internal citation omitted). "And while family ties alone may not qualify, parent-child relationships have been found to be among the most typical of confidential relationships." DeFranksupra, slip op. at 13 (citing Ostlundsupra, 391N.J. Super. at 401).
In the context of inter vivos gifts, "a presumption of undue influence arises when the contestant proves that the donee dominated the will of the donor or when a confidential relationship exists between the donor and done." Pascalesupra, 113 N.J. at 30 (internal citations omitted). "Where parties enjoy a relationship in which confidence is naturally inspired or reasonably exists, the person who has gained an advantage due to that confidence has the burden of proving that no undue influence was used to gain that advantage," In re Estate of Penna,322 N.J. Super. 417, 423 (App. Div. 1999), and "the donee has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence not only that 'no deception was practiced therein, no undue influence used, and that all was fair, open and voluntary, but that it was well understood.'" In re Estate of Mosery349 N.J. Super. 515, 522-23 (App. Div. 2002) (citing In re Dodge50 N.J. 192, 227 (1967)).

The person receiving gifts and greater benefit had a burden to show no deception was practiced and that all of the transactions were fair, open and voluntary, and that they were well understood. 

         One of the major cases dealing with undue influence was Haynes v. First National State Bank of New Jersey, 87 N.J. 163, 75-76 (1981). Here the Supreme Court held that the burden of proof establishing undue influence shifts to the proponent when a will benefits a person who stood in a confidential relationship to the decedent and there are suspicious circumstances, which need explanation. The suspicious circumstances need only be slight. Id. at 176. Moreover, when the evidence is almost entirely in the possession of one party and the evidence points to the proponent as asserting undue influence, a clear and convincing standard may be applied rather than the normal burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 183.

         Furthermore, the Haynes analysis was extended to situations in which there is a transfer of property where the beneficiary of the property and an attorney is on one side and the donor on the other. See Oachs v. Stanton, 280 N.J. Super. 478, 483 (App. Div. 1995).

         The court in Oachs determined that under circumstances such as these the donee bears the burden of proof to establish the validity of the gift, even in situations in which the donee did not dominate the decedent’s will. Id. at 485. This rule was established to protect a donor from making a decision induced by a confidential relationship the donee possesses with the donor. Id. Again, the burden is a clear and convincing standard. Id.

         The Supreme Court in Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 31 (1998), stated that when a donor makes a gift to a donee that he/she is dependent upon, a presumption arises that the donor did not understand the consequences of his/her act. In these situations the donee must demonstrate that the donor had disinterested and competent counsel. Id. Likewise, undue influence is conclusive, when a mentally or physically weakened donor makes a gift without advice or a means of support, to a donee upon whom he/she depends. Id.
        
         A confidential relationship can be found to exist when one is certain that the parties dealt on unequal terms. In re Stroming’s Will, 12 N.J. Super. 217, 224 (1951). The appropriate inquiry is if a confidential relationship existed, did the parties deal on terms and conditions of equality? Blake v. Brennan, 1 N.J. Super. 446, 453 (1948).
         Suspicious circumstances are not required to create a presumption of undue influence with regard to inter vivos gifts and the presumption of undue influence is more easily raised in an inter vivos transfer. See Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31; Bronson v. Bronson, 218 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 1987).

         Generally, an adult is presumed to be competent to make an inter vivos gift. See Conners v. Murphy, 100 N.J. Eq. 280, 282 (E. & A. 1926); Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 29 (1988). However, when a party alleges undue influence with regard to an inter vivos gift, the contesting party must prove undue influence existed or that a presumption of undue influence should arise. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 30.
         A presumption of undue influence arises when a confidential relationship exists between the donor and donee or where the contestant proves the donee dominated the Will of the donor. Id.; see also Seylaz v. Bennett, 5 N.J. 168, 172 (1950); In re Dodge, 50 N.J. 192, 227 (1967); Mott v. Mott, 49 N.J. Eq. 192, 198 (Ch. 1891); Oachs v. Stanton, 280 N.J. Super. 478 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that where a confidential relationship existed and that the donor did not rely upon the donee, a shifting of the burden was still appropriate); In re Neuman’s Estate, 133 N.J. Eq. 532, 534-35 (E. & A. 1943) (stating in a will context “Such burden does not shift merely because of the existence of a confidential relationship, without more, as in the matter of gifts inter vivos.”)
         The In re Dodge court explained why a presumption of undue influence arises in a confidential relationship and stated: “In the application of this rule it is not necessary that the donee occupy such a dominant position toward the donor as to create an inference that the donor was unable to assert his will in opposition to that of the donee.” In Re Dodge, 50 N.J. 192 (1967). The court referenced a much earlier case in explaining the rule’s application:
         "Its purpose is not so much to afford protection to the donor against the consequences of undue influence exercised over him by the donee, as it is to afford him protection against the consequences voluntary action on his part induced by the existence of the relationship between them, the effect of which upon his own interests he may only partially understand or appreciate." In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 228 citing Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J. Eq. 447, 449 (E. & A. 1904).
         In sum, once it is proven that a confidential relationship exists the burden shifts to the donee to show by clear and convincing evidence that no undue influence was used. Although the case law indicates suspicious circumstances need not be shown the donee must show all was fair, open and voluntary, no deception was practiced and that the transaction was well understood. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31; see also In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 227; Seylaz, supra, 5 N.J. at 173. Furthermore, confidential relationships arise in all types of relationships “whether legal, natural or conventional in their origin, in which confidence is naturally inspired, or, in fact, reasonably exists.”  In re Fulper’s Estate, 99 N.J. Eq. 292, 314 (Prerog. Ct. 1926); see Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 34. It appears confidential relationships exist in all cases in which:
         "The relations between the [contracting] parties appear to be of such a character as to render it certain that they do not deal on terms of equality, but that either on the one side from superior knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from over-mastering influence; or on the other from weakness, dependence or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage is rendered probable." Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 34, quoting In re Fulper, supra, 99 N.J. Eq. at 314; see also In re Dodge, supra, 50 N.J. at 228.

         In determining whether the Defendant was the dominant person in the relationship there is no clear-cut rule and instead the court must look to the particular circumstances of the matter. In re Fulper, supra, 99 N.J. Eq. at 315; Giacobbi v. Anselmi, 18 N.J. Super. 600, 616 (Ch. Div. 1952). In Fulper the court determined that a confidential relationship existed in a father-son relationship in which the father was advanced in age, weak and physically depended upon the son. Moreover, since the father sought the son’s assistance on business matters, lived with the son during the winter months and gave the son joint and several power over his checking account an actual repose of trust and confidence in the son was demonstrated. In re Fulper, supra, 99 N.J. Eq. at 318.

         In the Giacobbi case, supra, a confidential relationship was determined to exist between a mother and daughter, even though the mother did not suffer from mental or physical infirmity. There the mother was found to be alert, active, and somewhat independent. However, she turned to the daughter for small issues and problems when they occurred. Giacobbi, supra, 18 N.J. Super. at 617.

         Therefore, the burden can shift to Defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence the transaction was not unduly influenced. Furthermore, where a donor makes an “improvident” gift to the donee upon whom she depends that strips the donor of all or virtually all their assets, as here, a presumption arises that the donor did not understand the consequences of their act. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31, citing Vanderbach v. Vollinger, 1 N.J. 481, 489 (1949). Under those circumstances the donee must establish that the donor had the advice of competent and disinterested counsel. Id. citing Vanderback, supra, 1 N.J .at 488-89.
         Similarly, when a mentally or physically weakened donor makes a gift to a donee whom the donor is dependent upon, without advice, and the gift leaves the donee without adequate means of support, a conclusive presumption of undue influence arises. Id. citing Seylaz, supra, 5 N.J. at 173. However, when a donor is not dependent upon the donee “independent advice is not a prerequisite to the validity of an improvident gift even though the relationship between the parties is one of trust and confidence.” Id. citing Seylaz, supra, 5 N.J. at 173.
         Although suspicious circumstances are not required to be established in an inter vivos transfer for a presumption of undue influence to exist, thereby shifting the burden of proof, Plaintiff has raised the issue. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 30.

     If Undue Influence was 'Clear,' the Will of the Elderly Testatrix is Denied Admission to Probate.
The testatrix's Will was properly rejected as the product of undue influence because the proponent and the testatrix had a confidential relationship and because there were "suspicious circumstances" surrounding the execution of the will.
In Re Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Catelli 361 NJ Super. 478 (App. Div. 2003)
             In the Catelli case, Thomas R. Villone was named by his elderly aunt, Anna Villone Catelli, as the executor in a will and as the trustee under a living trust, which she executed on January 9, 1996. He appeals from the decision of the Chancery Division which refused to admit that 1996 will to probate, which named his cousin, George Villone, as the Administrator C.T.A. of Catelli's estate, which ordered him to restore assets to the estate, which awarded counsel fees and which dismissed a related complaint that he had filed in his effort to enforce certain provisions of the 1996 trust.
          The decision of the trial court was made following two days of testimony and the consideration by the court of deposition testimony given by witnesses, including Thomas Villone, who could not appear in New Jersey. In that decision, the court first held that, as a matter of public policy, the will could not be admitted to probate because at the time of the execution of the 1996 will, Anna Catelli had become blind and the only person who could verify that the contents of the documents had been read to her so that she knew what she was signing was Thomas, who the disputed documents made her sole heir. As an alternate ground, the judge analyzed the testimony and the evidence in the nature of an application for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case and determined that Thomas Villone could not prevail on the merits. Because we affirm the decision of the court based upon the alternate ground, we do not address the court's public policy rationale.
         Viewed in the light most favorable to Thomas Villone, the record discloses the following facts. The testator, Anna Catelli, was a widow who had no children and who lived alone. She had a number of nieces and nephews, including Thomas Villone and George Villone. She also had a brother, Robert, who died in Florida in 1994. Robert had named Thomas, his nephew, as the executor and principal beneficiary of his estate. Thomas, who was a self- employed long distance truck driver living in Arizona, had not had much contact with Anna Catelli, but telephoned to tell her of her brother's death. In that conversation, Catelli had asked him to come and visit her when he was next in New Jersey and he thereafter did so.
            Early in 1994, while Thomas was visiting her at her home, then in Springfield, Catelli asked him to drive her to her lawyer's office in Maplewood, which he did. He learned that day that Catelli had named him as her alternate power of attorney in the event that her long-time physician and confidante, Dr. Coppola, was unable to serve. While he was not aware of it at the time, she had gone to the lawyer's office that day to execute a will that left her estate to a variety of relatives and friends and to two churches and which included him as one of the residuary beneficiaries. Later that year, Catelli suffered a significant stroke which left her partially paralyzed and with limited powers of speech and sight. She was moved by Dr. Coppola to a nursing home, and thereafter to the Garden Terrace Nursing Home where she remained until her death. Thomas visited her at the nursing home from time to time when he was in New Jersey. Shortly before Thanksgiving 1995, Dr. Coppola telephoned Thomas and told him that Catelli wanted to make him her sole heir. Dr. Coppola died two or three days later.
             Following Dr. Coppola's death, Thomas invoked the power of attorney to make $10,000 gifts to himself, his wife and his daughter. He next received from Dr. Coppola's son all of the papers relating to Catelli's assets. While Thomas then knew that the designation of him as the sole heir was a departure from her earlier will, he did not discuss this apparent change of plans with Catelli. Rather, he immediately consulted an attorney in Arizona who prepared a living trust, which named Thomas as the trustee, and a pour-over will which named Thomas as the executor and sole heir. The Arizona attorney gave the documents to Thomas along with a letter which instructed him to have the documents reviewed by a New Jersey attorney and which suggested that Anna be represented by independent counsel. Thomas then came to New Jersey, arriving on January 6, 1996. While Thomas knew that Catelli had been represented in the past by the lawyer in Maplewood, he did not contact him and did not consult with any other New Jersey lawyer. Instead, he went directly to the nursing home and visited with Catelli.
                   Over the course of the next three days, while she remained in her bed and dozed on and off, he read the documents to her. Thomas has a high school education and concedes that he would not have been able to explain or interpret any of the language of the trust or the will to Catelli. He was aware that the trust and the will together would enable him to avoid probate, but he did not understand why that might be advantageous. At no time did he suggest that Catelli consult with an attorney or offer to contact her New Jersey lawyer for her.
                 After three days, Thomas made arrangements with the administrator of the nursing home to execute the trust and the will. The administrator served as a notary and two nurses observed Catelli place an "X" on the line Thomas indicated. Shortly after the execution, Thomas gave up his truck driving job, employed himself as the full-time manager of Catelli's assets and undertook to gain control of Catelli's interest in Excelsior Realty Ltd. (Excelsior), a family real estate venture, through the trust instrument. Prior to Catelli's death, Thomas' efforts to gain control of her interest in Excelsior consisted of correspondence with his cousin George Villone who was the General Partner of that venture. George Villone refused to acknowledge the validity of the January 9, 1996 trust agreement and refused to turn control of Catelli's interest in Excelsior over to Thomas. He continued to refuse after Catelli's death on July 5, 1997. As a result, in March 1999, Thomas instituted litigation, in his capacity as the executor of Catelli's estate and as her heir, against George Villone and Excelsior to force a transfer of Catelli's interest to him. That complaint was consolidated with the action filed subsequently by Thomas in the Chancery Division, Probate Part seeking to have the disputed will admitted to probate.
            The judge elected to first receive evidence relating to whether the 1996 will should be admitted to probate. At the close of the evidence offered in favor of the admission of the will, the trial court held, first, that Thomas Villone had failed to demonstrate that Catelli knew the contents of the documents that she had signed. Relying on Harris v. Vanderveer's Executor, 21 N.J. Eq. 561, 563 (E. & A. 1870), Hildreth v. Marshall, 51 N.J. Eq. 241, 250 (Prerog. Ct. 1893) and Day v. Day, 3 N.J. Eq. 549, 553-55 (Prerog. Ct. 1831), the judge rejected the will. While each of these decisions includes a discussion of the effect of visual impairment on the knowing execution of a will, each of them arose in the context of a dispute based on allegations of undue influence.
                  Thus, while each of these precedents rejected a proffered will executed by a testator with a significant visual or other impairment, none requires proof of knowing execution beyond that specified by the statute. N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2; N.J.S.A. 3B:3-4. The judge, however, reasoned that although the will had been executed in accordance with the statutory formalities, public policy demands proof beyond compliance with the formalities of execution if the testator can no longer see. He held that the will was invalid because there was no evidence from anyone other than the sole beneficiary that the will had been read to Catelli and that she knew what she was signing. He therefore created an additional requirement for probate of a will executed by a visually impaired person, citing public policy. We appreciate the trial judge's concern that a testatrix with a severe visual impairment is ordinarily unable, without the intervention of a neutral person, to determine if the will as drafted accurately memorializes her testamentary instructions. The same, of course, is true of a testator who cannot read by reason of illiteracy. But whether the statutory provisions for the witnessing and execution of the wills of such testators should be augmented to require that the pre-execution reading of the will to the testator be by a disinterested person is, in our view, a matter within the province of the Legislature.
         The court held We are satisfied, at least in this case, that we need not further consider that issue because, as the judge found, this record speaks so clearly of undue influence. The trial judge addressed the alternate ground of undue influence using the standard of a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs. R. 4:37-2(b). He found that there was a confidential relationship between the decedent and the beneficiary, that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution, that undue influence was therefore presumed, that the burden to overcome the presumption therefore shifted to Thomas and that the record before the court made it impossible for him to carry that burden. He therefore refused to admit the will to probate, dismissed the complaint against George Villone and Excelsior, admitted Catelli's 1994 will to probate, appointed George Villone as the Administrator C.T.A., directed Thomas to restore assets to the estate and approved fees and commissions. We agree with the judge's alternate analysis of the probate dispute and we affirm on that ground.
           Viewed in terms of undue influence, there can be no doubt about the issues before us. The judge identified several factors that supported his analysis of undue influence, including the fact that Thomas retained his own attorney to prepare the documents, that he did so based only on the conversation with Dr. Coppola and without any consultation with Catelli herself, that the documents were markedly different from Catelli's prior will, that Catelli was very debilitated and vulnerable, that the effect of the documents was an immediate vesting of control of all assets in Thomas through the inter vivos trust document, and that Thomas immediately upon the death of Dr. Coppola left his employment and by means of the power of attorney began to pay himself a commission and dispensed substantial gifts to himself and his immediate family, which bespoke self-dealing even prior to the time of the execution of the disputed documents.
               The court held: We concur with the judge's analysis of the effect of these facts. First, Catelli was clearly not well. The nursing administrator who saw her daily conceded that, while she had made progress in recovering from her stroke, her level of functioning was seriously diminished. Her short-term memory was significantly impaired. Her vision had deteriorated substantially. She required total care by the staff at the nursing home, needing daily assistance with feeding, bathing, and other basic needs. During the three days prior to the execution of the document, she did not leave her room, but remained in bed, dozing from time to time and barely communicating with anyone. While she was undoubtedly fond of Thomas, who was virtually her only visitor after the death of Dr. Coppola, she was especially vulnerable to his influence.
               Moreover, Thomas acted in a manner, which made his intentions clear. Even accepting as true his testimony that he learned from Dr. Coppola that Catelli intended to make him her sole heir, his behavior proves that he acted so as to overbear her will. He made no effort to discuss Catelli's intentions with her prior to acting for his unilateral benefit. He knew that Catelli had an attorney in New Jersey who had prepared at least one earlier will, but he deprived Catelli of the opportunity to consult with him. He did so in spite of the urging of his personal attorney from Arizona to have the documents reviewed by New Jersey counsel and to give Catelli the benefit of independent legal advice. He knew as well that the 1994 will left significant assets to the two churches and a hospital, left numerous specific bequests to friends and to a few family members, and included him only as one of the residuary beneficiaries. Nonetheless, he made no effort to discuss with Catelli why all were to be rejected in favor of him alone.
                Nor did he simply carry out the instruction that he be made her sole heir. Instead, he used his own attorney to secure immediate control of her assets. He knew that Catelli had not previously utilized a trust and he knew from his own lawyer that a living trust with a pour-over will would give him control before Catelli died. In fact as soon as he had the ability to exercise any control through the power of attorney, he gave $30,000 in gifts to himself, his wife and his daughter, an act well in excess of any prior expression of generosity by Catelli and not one she authorized. Shortly thereafter, he embarked on a new career, hiring himself to be the full time manager of her assets, in spite of his lack of any relevant training or experience. Those acts are the behavior not of one with Catelli's interests at heart, but of one bent on his own enrichment at her expense.
          The law governing undue influence is well established. While we generally presume that the testator is of sound mind and competent to execute a will, Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N.J. 65, 71 (1950), even a will which on its face appears to have been validly executed can be overturned upon a demonstration of undue influence. Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, 87 N.J. 163, 175-76 (1981). Similarly, an inter vivos transfer, as was this trust, is equally governed by the undue influence analysis. In re Dodge, 50 N.J. 192, 227-29 (1967); see Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 29-31 (1988).
           Undue influence is "defined as 'mental, moral or physical' exertion which has destroyed the 'free agency of a testator' by preventing the testator 'from following the dictates of his own mind and will and accepting instead the domination and influence of another.'" Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, supra, 87 N.J. at 176 (quoting In re Neuman, 133 N.J. Eq. 532, 534 (E. & A. 1943)). Where the will benefits one who enjoyed a confidential relationship with the testator, and where there are suspicious circumstances surrounding the will, the law presumes undue influence and the burden is upon the proponent of the will to disprove the presumption. In re Rittenhouse's Will, 19 N.J. 376, 378-79 (1955).
             The court held: The confidential relationship between Thomas and Catelli is both plain and conceded. See Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, supra, 87 N.J. at 176; In re Estate of Hopper, 9 N.J. 280, 282 (1952). The suspicious circumstances surrounding the will need only be "slight" to shift the burden of proof to the proponent to overcome them. See In re Estate of Lehner, 70 N.J. 434, 436 (1976); In re Blake's Will, 21 N.J. 50, 55-56 (1956).
Once the burden has shifted, the will proponent must overcome that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, supra, 87 N.J. at 177-78; In re Estate of Weeks, 29 N.J. Super. 533, 538-39 (App. Div. 1954); see In re Estate of Churik, 165 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd o.b., 78 N.J. 563 (1979). See also Pascale v. Pascale, supra, 113 N.J. at 31 (holding that donee of inter vivos gift bears burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence).
             The court held The record before us discloses no evidence by which Thomas could meet this burden. On the contrary, the record is overwhelmingly supportive of the finding of undue influence. The combination of the confidential relationship and the suspicious circumstances was more than sufficient to shift the burden to Thomas. The absence of any evidence tending to negate the presumption and the abundant evidence of self-dealing by Thomas support the conclusion that the testator's will was overborne. The trial judge, having heard and considered the evidence, appropriately found that the burden that had shifted to Thomas was one that he was unable to carry. Affirmed.

KENNETH  VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC
ATTORNEY AT LAW
 2053 Woodbridge Ave.
Edison, NJ 08817
(Phone) 732-572-0500
(Fax)  732-572-0030
                                    
TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
         In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters.  He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.

         Mr. Vercammen served as the Prosecutor for the Township of Cranbury, Middlesex County and was involved in trials on a weekly basis.  He also argued all pre-trial motions and post-trial applications on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
                 
         He has also served as a Special Acting Prosecutor in Woodbridge, Perth Amboy, Hightstown, Carteret, East Brunswick, Jamesburg, South Brunswick,  South River and South Plainfield for conflict cases.  Since 1989, he has personally handled hundreds of criminal and motor vehicle matters as a Prosecutor and now as defense counsel and has had substantial success.
                 
         Previously, Mr. Vercammen was Public Defender for the Township of Edison and Borough of Metuchen and a Designated Counsel for the Middlesex County Public Defender's Office.  He represented  indigent individuals facing consequences of magnitude.  He was in Court trying cases and making motions in difficult criminal and DWI matters.  Every case he personally handled and prepared.
                          
         His resume sets forth the numerous bar associations and activities which demonstrate his commitment to the legal profession and providing quality representation to clients.
        
         Since 1985, his primary concentration has been on litigation matters.  Mr. Vercammen gained other legal experiences as the Confidential Law Clerk to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Supreme Court) with the Delaware County, PA District Attorney Office handling Probable Cause Hearings,  Middlesex County Probation Department  as a Probation Officer, and an Executive Assistant to Scranton District Magistrate, Thomas Hart, in Scranton, PA.    


Tuesday, October 06, 2015

Piscataway Library Wills & Power of Attorney Seminar


Wills & Power of Attorney Seminar
Piscataway Library Kennedy Branch
500 Hoes Lane Piscataway NJ 08854
November 12 at 7pm

SPEAKER: Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. Edison, NJ
                (Author- Answers to Questions About Probate)

     The new NJ Probate Law made a number of substantial changes in Probate and the administration of estates and trusts in New Jersey.
Main Topics:
1. The New Probate Law and preparation of Wills    
2. 2015 changes in Federal Estate and Gift Tax 
3. NJ Inheritance taxes on estates over $675,000
4. Power of Attorney               
5.  Living Will                                  
6.  Administering the Estate/ Probate/Surrogate    
7. Questions and Answer          

      COMPLIMENTARY MATERIAL: Brochures on Wills, "Answers to Questions about Probate" and Administration of an Estate, Power of Attorney, Living Wills, Real Estate Sales for Seniors, and Trusts.
       Piscataway Library Kennedy Branch
732-463-1633
Can’t attend?  We can email you materials Send email to VercammenLaw@Njlaws.com

Free Will Seminars and Speakers Bureau for Groups
         10 years ago the AARP Network Attorneys of the Edison/Metuchen/Woodbridge area several years ago established a community Speakers Bureau to provide educational programs to AARP and senior clubs, Unions and Middlesex County companies. Now, volunteer attorneys of the Middlesex County Estate Planning Council have provided Legal Rights Seminars to hundreds of seniors, business owners and their employees, unions, clubs and non-profit groups. These quality daytime educational programs will educate and even entertain. Clubs and companies are invited to schedule a free seminar.

Sunday, October 04, 2015

NJ Caregiver Advise, Record, Enable (CARE) Act

NJ Caregiver Advise, Record, Enable (CARE) Act CHAPTER 68

      As amended by the committee, this law would require general acute care hospitals to provide patients and their legal guardians with opportunities to designate a caregiver following the patient’s entry into the hospital.  A caregiver is someone, such as a relative, spouse, partner, friend, or neighbor, who provides after-care assistance to a patient in the patient’s residence.  The types of after-care assistance provided may include assisting with basic activities of daily living, assisting with instrumental activities of daily living, and other tasks as determined to be appropriate by the discharging physician or another licensed health care professional.
      The hospital would be required to request written consent from the patient to release medical information to the caregiver.  If a patient declines to give written consent, the hospital is not required to provide the caregiver with after-care assistance instructions or notify the caregiver of the patient’s discharge or transfer to another facility.  A patient would be permitted to change designated caregivers at any time.  Being designated as a caregiver does not obligate the person to provide any after-care assistance to the patient.  In the event that a patient is unconscious or otherwise incapacitated upon entry into the hospital, the hospital would be required to provide the patient with an opportunity to designate a caregiver within a given timeframe, at the discretion of the attending physician, following recovery of consciousness or capacity.
      Except as otherwise provided by the law (and reiterated in the statement, above) a hospital would be required to notify the caregiver of the patient’s discharge or transfer to another facility as soon as possible, and, in any event, upon issuance of a discharge order by the patient’s attending physician.  As soon as possible, prior to a patient’s discharge from a hospital, the hospital would be required to consult with the designated caregiver and issue a discharge plan that describes a patient’s after-care assistance needs, if any.  The consultation would occur on a schedule that takes into consideration the severity of the patient’s condition, the setting in which care is to be delivered, and the urgency for caregiver services.  If the hospital is unable to contact the caregiver, the lack of contact may not interfere with, delay, or otherwise affect the medical care provided to the patient, or an appropriate discharge of the patient. 
      The discharge plan is to include the name and contact information of the designated caregiver, a description of all after-care assistance tasks necessary to maintain the patient’s ability to reside at home, and contact information for:  (1) any health care, community resources, and long-term services and supports necessary to successfully carry out the patient’s discharge plan; and (2) a hospital employee who can respond to questions.  The hospital would also be required to provide the caregiver with instructions, either in person or through video technology, at the discretion of the caregiver, in all after-care assistance tasks described in the discharge plan.  At a minimum, such instruction would be required to include a live or recorded demonstration of the necessary assistance tasks, which is performed by an authorized hospital employee, and an opportunity for the caregiver to ask questions about the assistance tasks and receive answers to those questions.
      The hospital would be required to document any information concerning the designation of a caregiver in the patient’s medical record, including:  the caregiver’s name, relationship to the patient, and contact information; any after-care assistance instructions provided to the caregiver; any change made by the patient in the caregiver designation; the patient’s decision not to designate a caregiver, if applicable; or the hospital’s inability to contact the caregiver, if applicable. 
      The law stipulates that nothing therein may be construed to interfere with the rights of an agent operating under a valid advance directive pursuant to the provisions of the “New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act,” P.L.1991, c.201 (C.26:2H-53 et al.), the "New Jersey Advance Directives for Mental Health Care Act," P.L.2005, c.233 (C.26:2H-102 et al.), or the “Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment Act,” P.L.2011, c.145 (C.26:2H-129 et al.).  Additionally, a patient would be permitted to designate a caregiver in an advance directive.
      In addition, the law provides that nothing therein may be construed to: 
      (1) create a private right of action against a hospital, a hospital employee, or any consultant or contractor with whom a hospital has a contractual relationship;
      (2) obviate the obligation of an insurance company, health service corporation, hospital service corporation, medical service corporation, health maintenance organization, or any other entity issuing health benefits plans to provide coverage required under a health benefits plan; or to delay the discharge of a patient, or the transfer of a patient from a hospital to another facility;
      (3) impact, impede, or otherwise disrupt or reduce the reimbursement obligations of an insurance company, health service corporation, hospital service corporation, medical service corporation, health maintenance organization, or any other entity issuing health benefits plans.
      The law also provides that a caregiver will not be eligible for reimbursement by any government or commercial payer for after-care assistance provided pursuant to the law’s provisions; and that a hospital, hospital employee, or any consultant or contractor with whom the hospital has a contractual relationship may not be held liable, in any way, for the services rendered or not rendered by a caregiver to a patient at the patient’s residence. 
AN ACT concerning designated caregivers and supplementing Title 26 of the Revised Statutes.

     BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

C.26:2H-5.24  Findings, declarations relative to designated caregivers.
     1.    The Legislature finds and declares that:
     a.    According to the American Association of Retired Professional’s Public Policy Institute, at any given time, an estimated 1.75 million people in New Jersey provide varying degrees of unreimbursed care to adults with limitations in daily activities.  The total value of the unpaid care to individuals in need of long-term services and supports amounts to an estimated $13 Million per year.
     b.    Caregivers are often members of the individual’s immediate family, but friends and other community members also serve as caregivers.  Although most caregivers are asked to assist an individual with basic activities of daily living, such as mobility, eating, and dressing, many are expected to perform complex tasks on a daily basis, such as administering multiple medications, providing wound care, and operating medical equipment.
     c.    Despite the vast importance of caregivers in the individual’s day-to-day care, and despite the fact that 78 percent of caregivers report managing multiple medications, administering injections, and performing other health maintenance tasks, research has shown that many caregivers feel that they do not have the necessary skill set to perform the caregiving tasks they are asked to perform when a loved one is discharged from the hospital. 
     d.    The federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) estimates that $17 million in Medicare funds is spent each year on unnecessary hospital readmissions.  Additionally, hospitals desire to avoid the imposition of new readmission penalties under the federal “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Pub.L.111-148, as amended by the “Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,” Pub.L.111-152 (ACA).
     e.    In order to successfully address the challenges of a surging population of older adults and others who have significant needs for long-term services and supports, the State must develop methods to enable caregivers to continue to support their loved ones at home and in the community, and avoid costly hospital readmissions.
     f.     The New Jersey Hospital Association and hospitals in its Hospital Engagement Network have utilized transitional caregiver models to reduce readmissions by over 13 percent from January 2012 to December 2013, leading to 5,492 fewer patients being readmitted during that time, at a cost savings of over $52 million.
     g.    Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature that this act enables caregivers to provide competent post-hospital care to their family and other loved ones, at minimal cost to the taxpayers of this State.

C.26:2H-5.25 Definitions relative to designated caregivers.
     2.    As used in this act:
     “After-care assistance” means any assistance provided by a caregiver to a patient following the patient’s discharge from a hospital that is related to the patient’s condition at the time of discharge, including, but not limited to: assisting with basic activities of daily living; instrumental activities of daily living; and other tasks as determined to be appropriate by the discharging physician or other health care professional licensed pursuant to Title 45 or Title 52 of the Revised Statutes.
     “Caregiver” means any individual designated as a caregiver by a patient pursuant to this act who provides after-care assistance to a patient in the patient’s residence. The term includes, but is not limited to, a relative, spouse, partner, friend, or neighbor who has a significant relationship with the patient.
     “Discharge” means a patient’s exit or release from a hospital to the patient’s residence following any medical care or treatment rendered to the patient following an inpatient admission.
     “Entry” means a patient’s admission into a hospital for the purposes of receiving inpatient medical care.
     “Hospital” means a general acute care hospital licensed pursuant to P.L.1971, c.136 (C.26:2H-1 et seq.).
     “Residence” means the dwelling that the patient considers to be the patient’s home.  The term shall not include any rehabilitation facility, hospital, nursing home, assisted living facility, or group home licensed by the Department of Health.

C.26:2H-5.26  Designation of caregiver.
     3. a. A hospital shall provide each patient or, if applicable, the patient’s legal guardian, with an opportunity to designate at least one caregiver following the patient’s entry into a hospital, and prior to the patient’s discharge to the patient’s residence, in a timeframe that is consistent with the discharge planning process provided by regulation.  The hospital shall promptly document the request in the patient’s medical record.
     b.    In the event that the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapacitated upon entry into the hospital, the hospital shall provide the patient or the patient’s legal guardian with an opportunity to designate a caregiver within a given timeframe, at the discretion of the attending physician, following the patient’s recovery of consciousness or capacity.  The hospital shall promptly document the attempt in the patient’s medical record.
     c.    In the event that the patient or legal guardian declines to designate a caregiver pursuant to this act, the hospital shall promptly document this declination in the patient’s medical record.
     d.    In the event that the patient or the patient’s legal guardian designates an individual as a caregiver under this act:
     (1)   The hospital shall promptly request the written consent of the patient or the patient’s legal guardian to release medical information to the patient’s designated caregiver following the hospital’s established procedures for releasing personal health information and in compliance with all State and federal laws, including the federal "Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996," Pub.L.104-191, and related regulations.
     (a)   If the patient or the patient’s legal guardian declines to consent to release medical information to the patient’s designated caregiver, the hospital is not required to provide notice to the caregiver under section 4 of P.L.2014, c.68 (C.26:2H-5.27) or provide information contained in the patient’s discharge plan under section 5 of P.L.2014, c.68 (C.26:2H-5.28).
     (2)   The hospital shall record the patient’s designation of caregiver, the relationship of the designated caregiver to the patient, and the name, telephone number, and address of the patient’s designated caregiver in the patient’s medical record.
     e.    A patient or the patient’s legal guardian may elect to change the patient’s designated caregiver at any time, and the hospital must record this change in the patient’s medical record before the patient’s discharge.
     f.     This section shall not be construed to require a patient or a patient’s legal guardian to designate any individual as a caregiver.
     g.    A designation of a caregiver by a patient or a patient’s legal guardian does not obligate the designated individual to perform any after-care assistance for the patient.
     h.    In the event that the patient is a minor child, and the parents of the patient are divorced, the custodial parent shall have the authority to designate a caregiver.  If the parents have joint custody of the patient, they shall jointly designate the caregiver.

C.26:2H-5.27  Notification to designated caregiver of discharge, transfer.
     4.    A hospital shall notify the patient’s designated caregiver of the patient’s discharge or transfer to another facility as soon as possible and, in any event, upon issuance of a discharge order by the patient’s attending physician.  In the event the hospital is unable to contact the designated caregiver, the lack of contact shall not interfere with, delay, or otherwise affect the medical care provided to the patient, or an appropriate discharge of the patient.  The hospital shall promptly document the attempt in the patient’s medical record.

C.26:2H-5.28  Hospital to consult with designated caregiver.
     5. a. As soon as possible prior to a patient’s discharge from a hospital to the patient’s residence, the hospital shall consult with the designated caregiver and issue a discharge plan that describes a patient’s after-care assistance needs, if any, at the patient’s residence.  The consultation and issuance of a discharge plan shall occur on a schedule that takes into consideration the severity of the patient’s condition, the setting in which care is to be delivered, and the urgency of the need for caregiver services.  In the event the hospital is unable to contact the designated caregiver, the lack of contact shall not interfere with, delay, or otherwise affect the medical care provided to the patient, or an appropriate discharge of the patient.  The hospital shall promptly document the attempt in the patient’s medical record.  At a minimum, the discharge plan shall include:
     (1)   The name and contact information of the caregiver designated under this act;
     (2)   A description of all after-care assistance tasks necessary to maintain the patient’s ability to reside at home; and
     (3)   Contact information for any health care, community resources, and long-term services and supports necessary to successfully carry out the patient’s discharge plan, and contact information for a hospital employee who can respond to questions about the discharge plan after the instruction provided pursuant to subsection b. of this section.
     b.    The hospital issuing the discharge plan must provide caregivers with instructions in all after-care assistance tasks described in the discharge plan.  Training and instructions for caregivers may be conducted in person or through video technology, at the discretion of the caregiver.  Any training or instructions provided to a caregiver shall be provided in non-technical language, to the extent possible.  At a minimum, this instruction shall include:
     (1)   A live or recorded demonstration of the tasks performed by an individual designated by the hospital, who is authorized to perform the after-care assistance task, and is able to perform the demonstration in a culturally-competent manner and in accordance with the hospital’s requirements to provide language access services under State and federal law;
     (2)   An opportunity for the caregiver to ask questions about the after-care assistance tasks; and
     (3)   Answers to the caregiver’s questions provided in a culturally-competent manner and in accordance with the hospital’s requirements to provide language access services under State and federal law.
     c.    Any instruction required under this act shall be documented in the patient’s medical record, including, at a minimum, the date, time, and contents of the instruction.

C.26:2H-5.29  Construction of act relative to advanced care directive.
     6. a.  Nothing in this act shall be construed to interfere with the rights of an agent operating under a valid advance directive pursuant to the provisions of the “New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act,” P.L.1991, c.201 (C.26:2H-53 et al.), the "New Jersey Advance Directives for Mental Health Care Act," P.L.2005, c.233 (C.26:2H-102 et al.), or the “Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment Act,” P.L.2011, c.145 (C.26:2H-129 et al.).
     b.    A patient may designate a caregiver in an advance directive.

C.26:2H-5.30  Construction of act relative to private right of action against hospital.
     7. a. Nothing in this act shall be construed to create a private right of action against a hospital, a hospital employee, or any consultants or contractors with whom a hospital has a contractual relationship.
     b.    A hospital, a hospital employee, or any consultants or contractors with whom a hospital has a contractual relationship shall not be held liable, in any way, for the services rendered or not rendered by the caregiver to the patient at the patient’s residence.
     c.    Nothing in this act shall be construed to obviate the obligation of an insurance company, health service corporation, hospital service corporation, medical service corporation, health maintenance organization, or any other entity issuing health benefits plans to provide coverage required under a health benefits plan. 
     d. (1)  A caregiver shall not be reimbursed by any government or commercial payer for after-care assistance that is provided pursuant to this act.
     (2)   Nothing in this act shall be construed to impact, impede, or otherwise disrupt or reduce the reimbursement obligations of an insurance company, health service corporation, hospital service corporation, medical service corporation, health maintenance organization, or any other entity issuing health benefits plans.

C.26:2H-5.31  Discharge, transfer of patient unaffected.
     8.    Nothing in this act shall delay the discharge of a patient, or the transfer of a patient from a hospital to another facility. 

C.26:2H-5.32  Rules, regulations.
     9.    The Department of Health, pursuant to the “Administrative Procedure Act,” P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.), shall adopt rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of this act including, but not limited to, regulations to further define the content and scope of any instructions provided to caregivers.

     10.  This act shall take effect  on the 180th day following the date of enactment.


     Approved November 13, 2014.